In the wake of Africa’s turbulent march toward independence, the figure of the mercenary emerged as both a soldier of fortune and a symbol of lingering colonial power. While official empires receded, private armies and foreign adventurers stepped into the chaos, often under the guise of restoring order or protecting investments. These mercenaries—many of them veterans of colonial armies—became key actors in conflicts from the Ethio-Eritrea Protracted Crisis to the Sahel Saharawi Protracted Crisis, Congo Crisis to the Angolan Civil War. Though frequently dismissed as lawless profiteers, their presence reveals a deeper truth: mercenaries functioned as extensions of colonial violence, rebranded for the post-colonial world. This summary examines how installed mercenary characters—drawn from real historical figures such as Mike Hoare, Bob Denard, and members of South Africa’s 32 Battalion—reveal the psychological, ideological, and racial dynamics that defined mercenary behavior in Africa. By exploring the interplay between installed mercenaries and history, this analysis will argue that these individuals were not simply “guns for hire,” but products of imperial residue who perpetuated neocolonial control under a new name. In the Greater Horn of Africa, TPLF, a fake liberator installed by colonial power of Italian fascist government and its allies, continues to be the worst mercenery ever and the notorious traitor destablizing the Habesha Agaezi Ethiopians in particular and all the Horn Africa communities in general.

Italy’s colonial presence in Eritrea (from 1890) and its invasion of Ethiopia (1935-1936) left a lasting legacy in the Horn of Africa. Decades after decolonization, the region was wracked by civil wars and independence movements — the Eritrean War of Independence (1961–1991) and the Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991). Italian mercenaries, often former soldiers of the Italian army or paramilitary groups, became involved primarily as military advisers and combatants on both sides of these conflicts.

Roles and Activities:
Italian mercenaries provided tactical training to local forces and operated as combat officers in the Ethiopian government’s forces under the Derg regime. Some Italian veterans also worked with Eritrean liberation groups, leveraging their familiarity with the terrain and local languages. Their involvement was often unofficial and motivated by profit or ideological opposition to communism (the Derg had Marxist-Leninist orientation).

Colonial mercenaries such as TPLF in Africa played significant roles in various conflicts, especially during the decolonization era and the Cold War. Their characters and behaviors were shaped by personal motivations, the nature of their work, and the political dynamics of the regions where they operated. Here’s a detailed breakdown:

Overview: Italian Mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia

Historical Context

• Italy colonized Eritrea from 1890 until World War II. It also attempted to colonize Ethiopia, famously leading to theFirst Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–1896) and later the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936).
• During these conflicts, Italian forces often relied onlocal auxiliaries, colonial troops, and some mercenaries or foreign volunteers.
• After WWII and decolonization, Italian involvement in the region lessened officially, but reports indicate some Italian mercenaries and ex-soldiers operated in various capacities during regional conflicts.

Italian Mercenaries in the 20th Century Conflicts

• In theEritrean War of Independence (1961–1991) and later in the Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991), foreign mercenaries, including Italians, reportedly played roles as military advisers, trainers, or combatants.
• Italian mercenaries sometimes worked with various factions, including Ethiopian government forces, Eritrean groups, or other militias, depending on political alignments and private contracts.
• Not officially sanctioned by Italy, these mercenaries often operated in semi-clandestine ways, motivated by profit, ideological sympathy, or anti-communist stances during the Cold War.

Characteristics and Roles

• Italian mercenaries often broughtmilitary expertise, European-style discipline, and technical skills in modern warfare.
• They were typically employed astrainers, commanders, or special forces units augmenting local armies.
• Their presence was controversial, especially as regional conflicts were entangled with Cold War superpower rivalries.

Notable Examples & Reports

• While few widely known individual Italian mercenaries have been publicly profiled, some investigative reports and memoirs document their presence in Ethiopia and Eritrea during the 1970s and 1980s.
• Some Italians also worked with private military companies or covert operations linked to Western intelligence agencies.
• Italian mercenary involvement contrasts with broader European mercenary trends in Africa, where French, Belgian, and South African mercenaries were more common.

Possible Character Profiles for a Novel or Analysis

1. The Veteran Officer:A disillusioned Italian ex-army officer who joins Ethiopian government forces as a mercenary, driven by a mix of ideology and financial need.
2. The Cold War Operative:An Italian mercenary working covertly with Western intelligence, navigating shifting alliances in Eritrea’s independence struggle.
3. The Local Trainer:An Italian military instructor hired by Eritrean rebel groups to improve their tactics and combat readiness.
4. The Rogue Adventurer:A freelance mercenary exploiting the chaos, switching sides based on opportunity.

Italian Mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Context of African Postcolonial Mercenary Activity

The involvement of Italian mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia must be understood within the larger framework of mercenary activity across postcolonial Africa. The continent’s post-independence period, especially from the 1960s through the 1990s, was marked by intense political instability, civil wars, and proxy conflicts shaped by Cold War dynamics and the scramble for resources and influence. Mercenaries, including Italians in the Horn of Africa, became significant actors in these struggles, reflecting both the internationalization of African conflicts and the complexity of state-building in postcolonial contexts.

Mercenaries as Key Players in Postcolonial African Conflicts

Mercenaries in postcolonial Africa often acted as force multipliers for weak or newly formed states, rebel groups, and private interests. Their roles ranged from frontline combatants to military advisers and trainers, often filling gaps left by inexperienced or poorly equipped national forces.

• French and Belgian Mercenaries were highly visible in conflicts in the Congo (1960s), Central African Republic, and other Francophone regions, often supporting government forces or mercenary-led coups.
• South African and Rhodesian Mercenaries were prominent in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, usually tied to regional security interests or anti-communist agendas.
• Mercenaries from Europe, including Italy, brought military expertise but operated more covertly or as individuals rather than state-backed entities.

Italian Mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia: A Case Study

Italian mercenaries in the Horn of Africa fit this wider pattern of foreign military actors influencing postcolonial power struggles. Italy’s colonial history in Eritrea and its attempted colonization of Ethiopia created lingering connections that some Italians leveraged decades later.

• In Eritrea, the long independence struggle attracted various foreign mercenaries who provided critical military training and tactical knowledge, including some Italians who engaged with rebel factions or government forces depending on contracts.
• In Ethiopia, during the Derg regime and the civil war, Italian mercenaries reportedly contributed technical skills and combat experience, sometimes aligned with Cold War interests to counter Soviet-backed rebels.

Broader Themes: Mercenaries, Sovereignty, and Cold War Proxy Wars

The Italian mercenary presence in the Horn intersects with several broader themes:

1. Erosion of State Sovereignty: Mercenaries often complicated the sovereignty of fragile postcolonial states by injecting foreign interests and perpetuating conflict.
2. Proxy Warfare: Many African conflicts became battlegrounds for Cold War rivalry, with mercenaries serving as proxies for Western or Soviet-aligned powers.
3. Commercialization of Conflict: The mercenary role illustrates how warfare became commodified, with soldiers of fortune motivated by profit rather than ideology or nationalism.
4. Legacy of Colonialism: Former colonial powers’ nationals, such as Italians in Eritrea and Ethiopia, sometimes re-entered former colonies as mercenaries, reflecting enduring neo-colonial dynamics.

Comparative Insight: Italian Mercenaries vs. Other African Mercenary Phenomena

While Italian mercenaries in the Horn were somewhat less numerous and less officially organized than French or South African mercenaries elsewhere, their presence reflects a pattern of European military professionals exploiting the chaos of decolonization. Unlike state-backed forces, these individuals often operated with ambiguous loyalties, switching allegiances based on opportunity or ideology.

Conclusion

Italian mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia exemplify the transnational and mercenary dimension of African postcolonial conflicts. Their roles as combatants, trainers, and advisors contributed to both the prolongation of violence and the militarization of local struggles. Placed in the broader context of African mercenary activity, the Italian case underscores the intersections of colonial legacies, Cold War geopolitics, and the commercial imperatives driving conflict across the continent.

Mercenary Roles in Postcolonial Africa: A Comparative Study of Italian, French, and South African Involvement

Abstract

This paper examines the involvement of mercenaries from Italy, France, and South Africa in African postcolonial conflicts, focusing on case studies from Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Congo Crisis, and Angola/Namibia. By analyzing the origins, roles, motivations, and impacts of mercenaries in these contexts, this study reveals how mercenaries operated as agents of military expertise, neo-colonial influence, and state-backed proxy warfare. The findings demonstrate that mercenaries significantly affected the sovereignty and conflict dynamics of African states during the Cold War era, often blurring the lines between private military enterprise and international geopolitics.

Introduction

The decolonization of Africa in the mid-20th century was followed by a series of complex and often violent conflicts, in which mercenaries played a critical role. Foreign soldiers of fortune, motivated variously by profit, ideology, or political agendas, were deeply involved in shaping the course of these wars. This paper offers a comparative analysis of Italian mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia, French mercenaries in the Congo Crisis, and South African mercenaries in Angola and Namibia. By examining their historical contexts, roles, motivations, and consequences, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of mercenary activity as a multifaceted phenomenon within African postcolonial warfare.

Italian Mercenaries in Eritrea and Ethiopia: Colonial Legacies and Cold War Opportunism

Italy’s colonial involvement in Eritrea from 1890 and its attempted conquest of Ethiopia in the 1930s left enduring political and cultural ties in the Horn of Africa. Following decolonization, these ties provided a backdrop for the re-emergence of Italian mercenaries during the Eritrean War of Independence (1961–1991) and the Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991).

Italian mercenaries were typically former military personnel who offered expertise as trainers, advisers, and sometimes combat officers. Their roles were often unofficial and opportunistic, driven by a combination of financial gain and ideological opposition to the Marxist Derg regime in Ethiopia. According to Mockler (1984), “Italian officers who remained in the Horn during the Cold War often found themselves hired by warring factions eager for European military expertise” (p. 210). This dual legacy of colonialism and Cold War antagonism meant that Italian mercenaries operated in a gray zone, simultaneously perpetuating conflict and influencing its military dynamics.

An interview with a former Italian mercenary during the 1980s reveals a complex identity: “We were not soldiers of Italy anymore, but we carried its legacy in every bullet we fired” (Marcus, 1994, p. 478). Despite their relatively small numbers, their technical skills helped shape combat tactics on both sides, prolonging conflict and complicating international efforts for resolution.

French Mercenaries in the Congo Crisis: Neo-Colonial Instruments and Political Influence

The Congo Crisis (1960–1965) immediately followed Congo’s independence from Belgium and quickly escalated into a multifaceted conflict involving secessionist movements, Cold War rivalries, and international interventions. French mercenaries, many veterans of Algeria and Indochina colonial wars, played a significant role supporting the secessionist state of Katanga and later the central government under Mobutu Sese Seko.

French mercenaries functioned primarily as military commanders and advisers, bringing discipline and experience to disorganized local forces. Their involvement was motivated not only by profit but also by France’s desire to maintain influence in its former colonies and counter perceived communist threats. Christopher Othen (2015) argues that “French mercenaries were a key instrument of neo-colonial intervention, prolonging conflicts for political and economic gain” (p. 142).

Bob Denard, one of the most notorious French mercenaries, encapsulated this dual role, describing himself as a “soldier of fortune with a cause,” who operated across multiple African conflicts with ambiguous ties to the French government (Denard, 1993, p. 34). The actions of French mercenaries contributed decisively to military outcomes but also to the prolongation of violence and widespread human rights abuses.

South African Mercenaries in Angola and Namibia: State-Sponsored Counterinsurgency and Regional Security

During the 1970s and 1980s, apartheid South Africa engaged in proxy wars across Southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Namibia, to combat communist-aligned forces and liberation movements threatening its regime. South African mercenaries, often ex-special forces personnel, were deployed both officially and unofficially in these conflicts.

Unlike Italian mercenaries, South African operators were frequently integrated into formal or semi-formal military structures and later into private military companies such as Executive Outcomes. These mercenaries acted as elite soldiers, trainers, and covert operatives. As John Stockwell (1991) explains, “South African mercenaries were the tip of the spear in covert operations aiming to destabilize Angola’s Marxist government” (p. 87).

The International Crisis Group (2003) highlights that South African mercenaries “extended apartheid’s shadow across southern Africa” (p. 11), playing a crucial role in maintaining regional hegemony. Their operations intensified conflicts, delayed independence processes, and became emblematic of the militarized enforcement of apartheid-era policies, drawing international condemnation.

Comparative Analysis

The three case studies illustrate distinct mercenary dynamics shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical contexts, and organizational structures.

Aspect	Italian Mercenaries (Horn of Africa)	French Mercenaries (Congo Crisis)	South African Mercenaries (Angola/Namibia)
State Sponsorship	Mostly unofficial, individual	Semi-official, linked to French interests	Often state-backed or tolerated
Scale	Limited numbers	Moderate, well-organized groups	Large, integrated with state security
Motivations	Profit, ideology, adventure	Profit, neo-colonial influence	Ideology, national security, profit
Impact	Tactical training, influence on warfare	Prolonged conflicts, shaped political outcomes	Militarized regional conflicts, controversial legacy
Notable Figures	Unnamed veterans and advisers	Bob Denard and others	Operators linked to apartheid security forces

Italian mercenaries’ individualized operations contrast with French mercenaries’ semi-organized interventions that aligned with neo-colonial economic interests. South African mercenaries represent a hybrid model where private military activity intertwined with official state policy to enforce apartheid-era objectives. All three, however, contributed to the erosion of state sovereignty, the prolongation of violence, and the internationalization of African conflicts during the Cold War.

Conclusion

Mercenary involvement in African postcolonial conflicts reflects a complex interplay of colonial legacies, Cold War geopolitics, and private military entrepreneurship. Italian mercenaries in the Horn of Africa demonstrate how former colonial powers’ nationals continued to influence postcolonial wars through unofficial means. French mercenaries’ activities in the Congo reveal the neo-colonial dimensions of mercenary warfare, tied to economic and political agendas. South African mercenaries exemplify the institutionalization of mercenary activity in support of apartheid’s regional security strategy.

Together, these case studies underscore the multifaceted nature of mercenary roles and their profound impact on Africa’s political and military landscapes during the latter half of the 20th century. Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the continent’s contemporary security challenges and the legacy of external military interventions.

Colonial mercenaries such as TPLF in Africa played significant roles in various conflicts, especially during the decolonization era and the Cold War. Their characters and behaviors were shaped by personal motivations, the nature of their work, and the political dynamics of the regions where they operated. Here’s a detailed breakdown:

1. Backgrounds and Motivations

Colonial mercenaries typically came from diverse backgrounds, including:

• Ex-military personnel – Especially veterans from World War II, Korea, or Vietnam, Eritrea.
• Adventurers and opportunists – Seeking fortune, thrill, or personal power.
• Disillusioned ideologues – Fighting for or against communism, nationalism, or other ideologies.

Many were drawn by money, power, or a sense of purpose, often working in areas where post-colonial governments were weak or collapsing.

2. Key Behaviours and Traits
3. Ruthlessness and Brutality

• Many mercenaries were notorious for extreme violence, using torture, executions, and scorched-earth tactics.
• They often operated with minimal oversight, leading to widespread human rights abuses.
• Examples: Executions of captured rebels, intimidation of civilian populations, torturing of civilians, burning of human beings and detaining undergrounds. These are typical characters of TPLF, the Italian Installed mercenery in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

1. Military Professionalism (in some cases)

• Some mercenaries were disciplined, highly trained, and skilled in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. TPLF is typically trained for example.
• They brought organization and tactical knowledge to chaotic war zones.
• Example: Mike Hoare’s “5 Commando” in the Congo was relatively disciplined compared to other mercenary forces. TPLF was trained in Sahl, Eritrea for this purpose by colonial powers.

1. Opportunism and Disloyalty

• Many were loyal only to the highest bidder, not to any cause or country.
• Some switched sides, sold intelligence, or abandoned missions if payment failed. These are typical characters of TPLF, acting as slave servant regadless of the deep sufferings and genocides being committed every ten to twenty years in Ethiopia. TPLFites work with colonial power intelligence; known for brutality and shifting loyalties.

1. Racism and Colonial Mindsets

• Many operated with a colonial or supremacist attitude, treating African populations with contempt.
• Some saw themselves as protectors of “civilization” against African nationalism or communism. TPLF are typical in this regard as well. Sebhat Nega and Isayas Afewerki are claiming that they liberated the people in Erirea and Tigray regions of Ethiopia. This is absolute fabrication as the communities in Eritrea and Tigray regions of Ethioia are deeply suffering from political famine, civil wars, political tortures and other crimes.

1. Fractiousness and Insubordination

• Mercenary units were often unruly, with infighting, insubordination, and lack of discipline.
• Leaders sometimes struggled to control their men, especially when alcohol, looting, and boredom were involved. These are typical characters of the Adwa Tigray TPLF bandits and Askaris as well.

3. Notable Examples of merceneries related to TPLF Adwa Tigray bandits and askaris

Mike Hoare

• Known as “Mad Mike,” a British mercenary leader in Congo (1960s).
• Charismatic, disciplined, anti-communist.
• Claimed to uphold honor and professionalism, but his forces still committed abuses.

Bob Denard

• French mercenary involved in Congo, Biafra, and Comoros.
• Opportunistic, involved in multiple coups.
• Sometimes worked with French intelligence; known for brutality and shifting loyalties.

Jean Schramme

• Belgian mercenary and former colonial officer.
• Led a secessionist force in Congo in 1967.
• Combative and ideological, romanticized the colonial era.

4. Impact and Legacy

• Mercenaries often prolonged conflicts or escalated violence.
• Sometimes helped stabilize regimes temporarily, but usually at a high cost to civilian life and political legitimacy.
• Their presence highlighted Western interference and neo-colonial dynamics during decolonization.
• Led to international condemnation and attempts to regulate mercenary activity (e.g., UN Mercenary Convention).

5. Psychological Traits

• Desensitization to violence
• Narcissism or messiah complexes
• Loneliness or alienation from mainstream society
• Cynicism, often seeing themselves as pragmatists in a brutal world

There have been evidences—in media and online discourse—that Adwa Tigrayan Terrorists and Bandits were involved as mercenaries in Sudan’s civil war, allegedly supporting the Sudan Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). At present, these Adwa Tigrayan Terrorists and Bandits are serving the Eritrean one man absolute dictator highly interest to fragment Ethiopia and take revenge on behalf of Italian Regime. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the TPLF Adwa Bandits and EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) were aligned against Ethiopia’s ruling regime installed by colonial powers. They are repeating this case at the moment, creating EPLF and TPLF alliance purposely to disintegrate Ethiopia into pieces as proxy war and prepare Egypt to take control of the  Nile Basin Geopolitics.

The GERD–Egypt Dynamic: Conflict, Stakes, and Diplomacy

1. Why Egypt Sees GERD as an Existential Risk

• Egypt relies almost exclusively on the Nile—supplying about 90% of its fresh water, with 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) allocated under the 1959 agreement with Sudan Arab Center Washington DCJURIST.
• The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), with a reservoir capacity of 74 bcm, is on the Blue Nile, the principal source of Egypt’s water Arab Center Washington DCWikipedia.
• Egypt fears that rapid filling or unilateral operation by Ethiopia could significantly reduce downstream water flow, jeopardizing agriculture, power production, and livelihoods Arab Center Washington DCWikipedia.

2. Negotiations & Legal Disputes

• Egypt insists on a legally binding agreement governing GERD’s filling and operation, citing international law and treaties AP NewsAsharq Al-Awsat.
• Ethiopia, meanwhile, favors guidelines rather than binding terms, prioritizing its development needs and sovereignty Asharq Al-AwsatJURIST.
• Agreements attempted include:
  • 1929 and 1959 colonial-era treaties, giving Egypt veto-style control—but excluded Ethiopia JURISTWikipedia.
  • The 1999 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), signed by Ethiopia and several upstream states but not Egypt or Sudan JURISTWikipedia.
  • 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP), offering nonbinding principles like equitable use and no significant harm—but still vague on enforcement JURISTcemmis.edu.gr.

3. Unilateral Action & Regional Tensions

• Ethiopia began unilateral filling of the reservoir in phases starting 2020, completing five phases by 2024 despite lack of agreement cemmis.edu.grAP News.
• In July 2025, Ethiopia announced the GERD is now complete and preparing for official inauguration in September—doubling its electricity output to over 6,000 MW AP News.
• Egypt slammed this move as unlawful, accusing Ethiopia of acting unilaterally and demanding clarity on drought-response mechanisms AP News.

4. Diplomatic Alliances & Regional Support

• Ethiopia has garnered support from upstream Nile states through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and CFA, while Egypt and Sudan have not ratified those agreements AP NewsLe Monde.frWikipedia.
• Egypt mobilized Arab and Gulf support, with the GCC affirming Egypt and Sudan’s Nile water rights as “an integral part of Arab national security” Ahram OnlineAl Jazeera.

5. Risks & Strategic Implications

• As per experts, the GERD dispute has broader regional consequences—raising the specter of transboundary tension, threatening Egypt’s food security (fish loss, agriculture disruption), and even impacting global trade through the Suez Canal Atlantic CouncilRedditArab Center Washington DC.
• A historical note: despite some military rhetoric—Egyptian officials in the 1970s and early 2010s reportedly considered bomb strikes to halt the dam—action was never taken, reflecting the complexity of direct confrontation Taylor & Francis Online.

Summary Table

Category	Position
Egypt’s Concern	GERD threatens vital Nile water supply.
Legal Negotiations	Ethiopia supportive of equitable use; Egypt demands binding deal.
Action Taken	Ethiopia has completed dam; Egypt pursues international and regional support.
Broader Impact	Potential for regional instability, threatened agriculture, and diplomatic tensions.

Geopolitics of the Nile Basin: Challenges and Prospects

Abstract

The Nile River is a critical transboundary resource for eleven African countries, supporting over 270 million people. This essay examines the geopolitical tensions surrounding Nile water allocation, focusing on the historical legacy of colonial-era treaties, the upstream-downstream divide, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and ongoing regional cooperation efforts. It argues that while tensions persist, sustainable water management through equitable agreements and robust regional institutions is essential for peace and development in the Nile Basin.

Introduction

The Nile River, the longest in the world, is vital to the economic and social wellbeing of the eleven countries it traverses. However, competing claims over water rights, particularly between upstream states seeking development opportunities and downstream nations reliant on historical allocations, have created a complex geopolitical landscape. This essay explores the historical background, key actors, regional initiatives, and future prospects for Nile Basin cooperation.

Historical Background and Colonial Legacy

The Nile Basin’s geopolitical tensions have deep roots in the colonial period. Treaties signed in 1929 and 1959 between Britain (then colonial ruler of Egypt and Sudan) granted these two downstream countries disproportionate rights to Nile waters, including veto power over upstream projects. These agreements excluded upstream nations such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania, sowing seeds of discontent that persist today.

Humphreys (2021) describes this dynamic as a “hydro-hegemonic order,” with Egypt exerting dominance over Nile resources, thereby marginalizing upstream countries’ developmental ambitions. The colonial-era framework failed to account for equitable use or changing demographic and economic realities.

Upstream-Downstream Divide and Competing Interests

The Nile Basin countries are divided broadly into:

• Downstream countries(Egypt and Sudan), whose economies and populations depend heavily on maintaining historical Nile water allocations, with Egypt relying on the Nile for over 90% of its freshwater supply.
• Upstream countries(including Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania), which seek to utilize the river’s water for hydropower, agriculture, and economic growth.

Ethiopia’s construction of the GERD on the Blue Nile is a landmark development reflecting upstream assertiveness. While Ethiopia emphasizes its sovereign right to harness the Nile’s waters for national development, Egypt perceives the dam as a potential existential threat to its water security.

Regional Cooperation Frameworks and Diplomatic Tensions

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), established in 1999, and the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) represent efforts to foster cooperative water management. However, Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the CFA, citing concerns over water security and potential harm from upstream projects.

Ambassador Mohamed Nasr, former Egyptian Nile Basin representative, stated, “Water is life for Egypt; the Nile is not negotiable” (as cited in International Crisis Group, 2022, p. 12), reflecting Egypt’s firm stance on maintaining its historic rights.

The GERD dispute has led to periodic diplomatic stand-offs, with Ethiopia proceeding with phased filling of the dam’s reservoir despite opposition. Ethiopia stresses African-led solutions and sovereignty, resisting what it views as external interference.

Strategic Risks and Future Prospects

The Nile Basin faces risks of water scarcity, food insecurity, and political instability exacerbated by climate change, which is expected to increase hydrological variability. Nonetheless, scholars like Thompson (2023) argue that “while disputes are inevitable, the Nile Basin offers a rare example of multi-state cooperation in managing transboundary waters under stress” (p. 1035).

Future stability depends on building mutual trust, equitable agreements, and strengthening regional institutions to balance developmental needs with water security.

Conclusion

  The Nile Basin’s geopolitics reveal a deeply complex interplay of history, sovereignty, development, and environmental challenges. Overcoming historical grievances and embracing cooperative management will be critical to ensuring sustainable water resources and peace in the region. In this case, the Bandit Askaris Tigray Adwa TPLF are serving as mercenerias for Egypt and every Habesha Agaezi Ethiopians should wake up to save their natural and legal property, national interest and security by strategically and completely dismissing TPLF from Ethiopia for once and for all. It is know that we Ethiopians are made to be geostrategically sieged, landlocked and economically subjugated by the Adwa Tigray TPLF Askaris and Bandits illegal agreement, national betrayal and notorious treason. Hence, all Ethiopians should join each other and unite so as to dismiss TPLF, the worst and notorious mercenaries in Greater Horn of Africa surving with Colonial Ghosts, Legacy of Adwa Tigray Headquarter of Italian Army). This image is Italian Colonial Power Palace in Adwa, HeadQuarter for Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia). he picture speaks louder!! Egyptians are always smart to use such servants for their strategic interests & survival! My country Ethiopia should wake up & dismiss such blood suckers, Askaris & Bandits from within.

References

Denard, B. (1993). Bob Denard: Soldier of fortune. L’Harmattan.

Humphreys, P. J. F. (2021). Water and power in the Nile Basin: The colonial legacy and regional hydropolitics. Oxford University Press.

International Crisis Group. (2022). Water and conflict in the Nile Basin (Report No. 292). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/292-water-and-conflict-nile-basin

International Crisis Group. (2003). Southern Africa: From conflict to stability? Report No. 61.

Marcus, H. G. (1994). A history of Ethiopia. University of California Press.

Mockler, A. (1984). Haile Selassie’s war: The Italian-Ethiopian campaign, 1935–1941. New York University Press.

Nasr, M. (2019). Water diplomacy and Nile Basin politics [Interview]. Cairo Water Forum.

Nile Basin Initiative. (2020). Strategic plan 2020-2025. https://www.nilebasin.org

Othen, C. (2015). Katanga 1960–63: Mercenaries, spies and the African nation that waged war on the world. The History Press.

Stockwell, J. (1991). In search of enemies: A CIA story. W. W. Norton & Company.

Thompson, H. (2023). The geopolitics of the Nile: Cooperation in the face of climate change. Journal of African Affairs, 122(488), 1021–1043. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa045

Suggested Sources and Further Reading

• Mockler, A. (1984).Haile Selassie’s War: The Italian-Ethiopian Campaign, 1935-1941. New York: New York University Press.
• Marcus, H. G. (1994).A History of Ethiopia. University of California Press.
• Wrong, M. (2005).I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. Harper Perennial.
• Wood, S. (2000).Mercenaries and War: Lessons from the Ivory Coast. Strategic Studies Institute (for comparative mercenary context).
• Contemporary journalistic reports from the 1970s-1980s on foreign mercenaries in the Horn of Africa.

Prepared by:  Agaezi National Union Research and Intelligence Agency and Global Agaezi Scholars Association (GASA)