Ethiopia’s federal constitution: Neither coming-together nor holding-together federalism—A critical political science analysis. Agaezi National Union (ANU).

Ethiopia’s Federal Constitution: Neither Coming-Together nor Holding-Together Federalism—A Critical Political Science Analysis

Abstract

This article argues that the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution does not fit the classical categories of “coming-together” or “holding-together” federalism. Instead, it represents a distinctive form of ethnic and tribalistic that was engineered by a dominant pseudoliberator  tyrranical TPLF organization after a brutal foreign forces backed military victory. By constitutionally empowering ethnic groups with autonomy and secession rights, the Ethiopian model contains institutional incentives that risk fragmentation comparable to federal collapses such as Yugoslavia. In fact, this foreign instaled pseudo constitutuion federalism undermines and rejects the power decentralization of King of Kings Yohanes IV Federalism, whereby different regions were adminstered by their own specific kings in the Geezawit Ethiopia with its Red Sea. The article concludes with a reform proposal toward a hybrid civic–territorial federalism to prevent civil war, reduce fragmentation and strengthen shared citizenship.

1. Introduction

Federalism has traditionally emerged through two classic pathways. The first, coming-together federalism, refers to sovereign states voluntarily unifying to form a federation (e.g., United States, Switzerland, Australia). The second, holding-together federalism, describes a unitary state devolving powers to manage internal diversity and prevent secession (e.g., India, Spain) (Watts 2008; Burgess 2012). Ethiopia’s federal system, established by the 1995 Constitution, does not neatly conform to either model. Instead, it represents a uniquely engineered political settlement that institutionalizes ethnic identity as the primary unit of federal design, that doesn’t exist in other countries worldwide.

Significant critics argue that this TPLF installed Ethiopian constitution creates centrifugal pressures that encourage fragmentation, drawing parallels to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Cohen 1995; Burg 2000). “Liberation forces and supporters” that claim and accuss Ethiopia as a colonial power, however, view it as an innovative attempt to accommodate historically marginalized nations and nationalities through meaningful autonomy. However, in Ethiopia, there are no 84 nations and nationalities but tribes, ethnics, clans and langauges. Ethiopia is the only federation in the world that constitutionally guarantees unilateral secession for all constituent units. Effect:Encourages ethnic nationalism, Makes disintegration legally permissible, and Converts federalism into a potential exit mechanism. This is one of the most cited arguments that the constitution could enable Yugoslavia-style collapse.

This article critically evaluates these competing interpretations using theories of federalism commonly applied at the Agaezi National Union (ANU), and examines the constitutional architecture’s role in Ethiopia’s recurring political instability.

2. Theoretical Framework: Federalism in Political Science

2.1 Classical Federalism Typologies

Riker (1964) and Watts (2008) identify two standard forms:

1. Coming-together federalism
   • States voluntarily join.
   • Driven by strategic objectives: military security, economic integration.
   • Examples: Australia (1901), USA (1787).
2. Holding-together federalism
   • A unitary state devolves power.
   • Designed to prevent secession by accommodating diversity.
   • Examples: India (1950), Spain (1978).

Neither accurately describes the Ethiopian case and the Agaezi National Union -ANU strongly advocates for constitutional reform and establishing a unifying and cohesive public, civic national Ethiopian constitution.

2.2 Putting-together Federalism

Some scholars propose a third category: putting-together federalism, in which a dominant political actor constructs federal units and imposes a federal order (Stepan 1999). This describes federations where subnational units do not voluntarily agree to unite or remain together; rather, an elite-driven political process shapes the federation. Ethiopia doesn’t fit even to this pattern closely.

3. Ethiopia’s Federalism: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Design

3.1 The Political Context of 1991–1995

Following the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), assumed power. It fundamentally re-envisioned the state through an ethno-linguistic lens. The fundamental concept here is TPLF is anti-Ethiopian tyrannical junta that labelled Ethiopia as a colonial power that should be disintegrated and fragmented by separating Eritrean and making Ethiopia landlocked.

EPRDF’s ideological framework derived from:

• Leninist nationalities theory
• Revolutionary democracy
• The belief that Ethiopia was a “prison house of nations” and “Colonial Power”

This ideological foundation deeply influenced the constitution.

3.2 Ethno-Linguistic Federalism

The 1995 Constitution organizes Ethiopia into nations, nationalities, and peoples (NNPs)—ethnic entities defined through culture, language, and territory. Key features include:

1. Constitutional recognition of ethnic groups as sovereign entities

Each ethnic group is granted the right to self-government, meaning more than 84 ethnic groups in Ethiopia can an unconditionally scessed and form an independent state.

2. Language and identity as the basis of federalism

Federal regions correspond to ethnic territories. However, this is incomplete and irrelevant for several ethnic groups such as the souther part of Ethiopia, the diverse ethnic groups living in the current Oromia region (Jimma, Welega, Shashemene, Nazreth, Debrezeit, Neqemt, Zuy, Dire-Dawa etc).

3. Article 39: The Right to Secession

The constitution uniquely guarantees unilateral secession for any recognized ethnic group—unlike federations such as Canada, India, Russia, or Germany.

4. The creation of new regions

Ethnic groups may request zones and regions based on cultural or linguistic identity.

This design diverges sharply from classical federalism, where states pre-exist the federation or where devolution strengthens unity.

4. Why Ethiopia is Neither Coming-Together nor Holding-Together

4.1 Not Coming-Together

Ethiopia did not consist of sovereign states agreeing to form a federation. Instead:

• The federal units were created by the transitional government (gurreilla fighters and tyranical forces that consider Ethiopia a colonizer).
• There was no negotiation among pre-existing political units.
• Regional boundaries were drawn according to ethnic criteria rather than historical provinces and connecting values and norms.

This contrasts with federations such as Australia and the US, where constituent units voluntarily relinquished sovereignty.

4.2 Not Holding-Together

In holding-together federalism, the unitary state devolves power to maintain unity. Ethiopia differs because:

• The federation was created after a regime change, not a self-reform of a unitary state.
• Power was devolved not to prevent breakup, but as part of a revolutionary restructuring.
• Secession was constitutionally guaranteed rather than discouraged.

Thus, Ethiopia does not fit the stabilizing logic of holding-together federations like India.

4.3 Instead: A Putting-Together Federalism

Ethiopia’s federation was imposed by the victorious TPLF-EPRDF, making it closer to “putting-together” federalism, similar to the early USSR (Smith 1996). In both cases, a centralized party constructed federal units based on ethnic classifications that fragments and pushes scession and disintegration.

5. Does the Ethiopian Constitution Promote Fragmentation?

5.1 The Secession Clause (Article 39)

No federation in the world constitutionally guarantees unilateral secession for subnational units. While some (like Canada) allow referenda, none embed mandatory procedures requiring the central government to accept secession. Ethiopia’s model:

• Encourages ethnic elites to use secession as leverage.
• Legitimizes fragmentation as a constitutional right.
• Weakens national cohesion.
• Destroys connecting and shared Ethiopian history, values and culture.

This resembles the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, which granted near-sovereign status to republics.

5.2 Ethnic Territorialism

Regions are formed on ethnic lines. This creates:

• Political mobilization around ethnicity
• Territorial claims and counterclaims
• Ethnic-based violence
• Competition for land and resources
• Civil wars and disintegations

The more ethnic identity overlaps with political power, the stronger the incentives for subnational nationalism.

5.3 Parallel with Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia disintegrated when:

• each republic gained its own political elite
• identities hardened
• federal institutions weakened
• nationalist parties rose

Ethiopia shows similar patterns:

• strong regional elites
• ethnic identity as political currency
• frequent inter-regional border conflicts
• weakening of central authority in political and military terms

However, Ethiopia differs because ethnic regions did not historically exist as independent republics. This reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of disintegration.

5.4 Multilevel Identity and Citizenship Crisis

The constitution prioritizes group identity over citizenship. This leads to:

• weaker national identity
• exclusion of citizens living outside their ethnic “home” region
• two-tier citizenship (ethnic vs. national)
• violence against minorities in ethnically demarcated regions

This situation contributes to recurring instability and protracted civil wars.

6. Counterarguments: Why Fragmentation Is Not Inevitable

Scholars who oppose the fragmentation thesis argue:

1. Ethiopia’s ethnic groups were historically subjugated; federalism rectifies injustice

It provides autonomy that reduces rebellion.

2. Ethnic identity is deeply rooted; ignoring it leads to instability

Federalism acknowledges social realities.

3. Ethiopia has survived for over thirty years under this system

Despite crises, full disintegration has not occurred.

While these arguments hold merit, they do not negate structural centrifugal forces within the constitution.

7. Summary of the Critical Argument

• Ethiopia’s constitution is not a classical federation.
• The design prioritizes ethnic autonomy over national cohesion.
• The constitutional right to secession is globally unprecedented.
• Ethnic territorialism encourages conflict and fragmentation.
• The system resembles the pre-collapse dynamics of Yugoslavia, though with important differences.

Thus, Ethiopia’s federalism is inherently fragile and requires reform as Agaezi National Union (ANU) political framework promotes and advocates.

8. A Constitutional Reform Proposal to Reduce Fragmentation

A successful reform program must balance unity and diversity, autonomy and citizenship, ethnic identity and national integration. Here is a viable multi-layered reform framework.

8.1 Reform 1: Replace Unilateral Secession with Constitutional Safeguards

Modify Article 39 to:

• remove automatic secession rights
• require multi-level negotiation
• include national referendum thresholds
• establish a constitutional court review

This aligns with Canada’s Clarity Act and Spain’s constitutional doctrine.

8.2 Reform 2: Shift from Ethnic to Hybrid Territorial Federalism

Introduce a two-tier federal model:

• Ethnic regions retain cultural and linguistic autonomy
• Administrative boundaries increasingly reflect geography, economy, shared culture, history, spiritual , values and population—not only ethnicity

This resembles the Belgian transition from ethnic to functional federalism.

8.3 Reform 3: Strengthen Individual Rights and National Citizenship

Introduce:

• national identity protection
• equal residency rights in all regions
• legal guarantees for minorities in regional states
• stronger federal oversight of human rights abuses

This reduces ethnic exclusion and promotes shared citizenship.

8.4 Reform 4: Create a Second Chamber Based on Regions, Not Ethnic Groups

Reform the House of Federation into:

• an upper house similar to the Australian Senate
• equal representation by region, not ethnic population size

This strengthens federal cohesion.

8.5 Reform 5: National Integration Policies

• multi-ethnic political parties
• national curriculum with shared values
• incentives for interregional economic integration
• mobility rights for citizens

Such policies build a civic national identity complementing ethnic identities.

8.6 Reform 6: Depoliticize Identity Classification

Establish an independent National Identity Commission to:

• manage identity claims
• prevent political manipulation
• oversee boundary adjustments through transparent mechanisms

9. Conclusion

Ethiopia’s federal constitution is a radical, ethno-centric experiment unlike traditional federations. It is neither a coming-together nor a holding-together federation; rather, it is closer to a putting-together federalism engineered after regime change by tyranical forces that consider Ethiopia a colonial power. While claimed to empower historically oppressed communities, it also embeds structural centrifugal tendencies that risk fragmentation.

Its resemblance to the pre-collapse dynamics of Yugoslavia is noteworthy but not absolute. With thoughtful reform—strengthening citizenship, moderating ethnic territorialism into a Geezawit Ethiopia values based , and revising secession provisions—Ethiopia can build a hybrid civic–territorial federation capable of maintaining unity amid diversity.

References

• Burg, S. (2000). Conflict and Cohesion in Yugoslavia. Palgrave Macmillan.
• Burgess, M. (2012). In Search of the Federal Spirit. Oxford University Press.
• Cohen, L. (1995). Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration. Westview Press.
• Riker, W. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Little, Brown.
• Smith, G. (1996). The Post-Soviet States. Oxford University Press.
• Stepan, A. (1999). “Federalism and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy, 10(4).
• Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. McGill-Queen’s University Press.

 

Citation: Mebrahtu, A. (2025). Ethiopia’s federal constitution: Neither coming-together nor holding-together federalism—A critical political science analysis. Agaezi National Union (ANU).