๐๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐จ๐ ๐๐๐๐
๐๐ฎ๐๐จ๐ซ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐ญ๐จ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐
By Asgede Gebreselassie
For those who served in the higher ranks of the TPLF during the armed struggle between 1975 and 1991, the nature of the relationship between the TPLF and the Eritrean Peopleโs Liberation Frontโcommonly known as Shaebia or the EPLFโshould not be a mystery.
According to Asgede Gebreselassie, the history of that relationship was marked not by an alliance of equals, but by domination, manipulation and repeated sacrifice of Tigrayan fighters and resources for objectives primarily benefiting the EPLF. His central argument is that this pattern, established during the armed struggle decades ago, is once again being repeated by elements of the present TPLF leadership.
Asgede directs his appeal particularly to former senior commanders and officials who, he says, personally witnessed these events and therefore cannot plead ignorance about the past.
๐๐ข๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฒ๐๐ง ๐
๐ข๐ ๐ก๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฌ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐๐๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐
Asgede traces the problem to the period between approximately 1972 and 1976 E.C., when large numbers of TPLF fighters were sent to the Sahel to assist the EPLF.
He argues that ordinary TPLF fighters were never fully told why they were being sent or whose strategic objectives they were serving. According to his account, influential TPLF leadersโincluding Sebhat Nega, Giday Zeratsion and othersโaccepted an arrangement under which Tigrayan fighters were deployed for more than two years to protect EPLF positions.
The conditions, he recalls, were exceptionally harsh. Fighters dug trenches and bunkers, hauled construction materials over long distances, carried water and endured severe discipline, imprisonment and physical abuse. Many died.
๐๐ฌ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐ฑ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ง๐ ๐จ๐ ๐ฏ๐ข๐ซ๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐ฌ๐๐ซ๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐
He maintains that prominent figures who later rose to senior positions within the TPLF and Ethiopian government were well aware of these conditions. Among those he names are Debretsion Gebremichael, Getachew Assefa and Addis Alem Balema.
The sacrifice did not end with the first deployment.
After surviving years in the Sahel and returning to Tigray, fighters were reportedly redeployed alongside several brigades and thousands of newly trained recruits to help the EPLF withstand Ethiopia’s major Red Star military offensive.
Once again, according to Asgede, thousands of Tigrayans died in a war whose primary beneficiary was the EPLF.
๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐ง๐๐ง๐ฌ๐ฐ๐๐ซ๐๐
Asgede says TPLF fighters repeatedly protested the treatment they received from the EPLF.
Senior TPLF military figures were allegedly informed of abuses and grievances, but the complaints produced little response.
Some fighters, he says, became so disillusioned that hundreds abandoned the movement and returned home through territory controlled by the Derg.
For Asgede, their experience demonstrates that the relationship between the two organizations was never the romanticized partnership later portrayed in political narratives. Rather, he argues, the TPLF leadership tolerated humiliating conditions because it had subordinated itself to EPLF strategic authority.
๐๐ง ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ง๐๐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐๐ ๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐๐
๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฌ
Asgede further argues that the EPLF never assisted the TPLF out of ideological solidarity or generosity.
From the earliest stages of cooperation, he says, the EPLF carefully evaluated whether the TPLF could serve its interests.
He recalls an early episode in which TPLF recruits were reportedly denied modern weapons because the EPLF did not yet trust or control the organization. Only after the EPLF studied the TPLF and concluded that cooperation could benefit its own struggle did the relationship deepen.
From that point onward, Asgede contends, the EPLF followed a consistent principle: it would assist the TPLF only where doing so advanced EPLF interests.
In his words, Shaebia would not sacrifice anything substantial unless there was a clear strategic return.
That principle, he argues, explains much of the subsequent history.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐๐ก๐จ ๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ฌ๐จ๐๐
Asgede cites the fighting around Enticho in 1968 E.C. as one example.
TPLF forces had reportedly prepared for a joint military operation against government forces. According to his account, however, the EPLF abandoned the arrangement when cooperation with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party appeared to offer greater immediate advantage.
To Asgede, this episode illustrated a pattern that would recur repeatedly: alliances were temporary and disposable whenever EPLF calculations changed.
๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ง๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐ข๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐จ ๐ ๐๐๐ญ๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐๐ข๐๐ฅ๐
A far more consequential example came during the Derg’s northern offensives around 1970 E.C.
Asgede argues that the EPLF sought to prevent Ethiopian government forces from carrying the war into Eritrea by encouraging major resistance inside Tigray.
The result, he says, was that vast areas of Tigray became a battlefield.
For more than three months, communities stretching hundreds of kilometersโfrom western and central Tigray toward Zalambessaโwere exposed to intense military operations.
According to Asgede, Tigrayan civilians, livestock, agricultural resources and fighters bore the cost.
He claims that some TPLF members questioned this strategy even at the time. They reportedly argued that if the main objective was to defend Eritrean territory, the battle should not be deliberately transferred onto Tigrayan soil.
Those who raised such objections, however, were allegedly treated with suspicion by the dominant TPLF leadership.
The fundamental question, Asgede argues, was never adequately answered: Why should Tigray sacrifice its people and resources for a war whose principal strategic benefit lay elsewhere?
๐๐ข๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฒ’๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฌ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐๐ ๐๐ฒ ๐๐๐ซ
The human cost was accompanied by enormous material losses.
Asgede recalls grain, livestock, pack animals, butter, honey and other resources being mobilized from Tigrayan communities to sustain military operations.
Donkeys and mules were used for transport. Farmers surrendered food and livestock. Communities already living under difficult conditions were expected to support the war effort.
Yet Asgede alleges that, once the EPLF decided to withdraw, it left without properly informing its TPLF allies.
He further claims that captured weapons were removed during the withdrawal, leaving TPLF forces and Tigrayan communities to face the consequences.
For him, the episode demonstrated the unequal nature of the alliance: Tigray provided manpower, territory and resources, while strategic decisions remained largely in EPLF hands.
๐
๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ง๐, ๐๐๐ซ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ง
Asgede’s most painful recollection concerns the catastrophic famine of 1977 E.C.
Tigray was simultaneously confronting drought, hunger and a major Derg military campaign. Tens of thousands of civilians attempted to escape toward Sudan, where international relief supplies were available.
Families walked through the lowlands toward Kassala, often under extreme heat and without sufficient food or water.
Asgede accuses the EPLF of obstructing some of these movements and of placing military considerations above the survival of starving Tigrayan civilians.
He describes elderly people, children, pregnant women and nursing mothers collapsing along the Barka route from hunger, exhaustion, thirst and exposure while Derg aircraft remained an additional threat overhead.
The bitterness of this episode, he argues, was intensified by the fact that many of those civilians were relatives of TPLF fighters who had themselves previously fought to defend EPLF positions.
Asgede also alleges that humanitarian supplies intended for Tigrayโincluding flour, sugar, cooking oil, biscuits, canned foods and other relief materialsโwere diverted or controlled by the EPLF.
These allegations form one of the strongest elements of his indictment of the wartime relationship.
๐๐๐๐
๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐จ๐ฅ ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ ๐๐ข๐ฉ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฆ๐๐๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐
๐จ๐ซ๐๐ข๐ ๐ง ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐
The relationship, Asgede argues, extended far beyond battlefield cooperation.
He says the EPLF sought to control the TPLF’s diplomatic contacts and discouraged independent relationships with foreign governments or organizations.
In his account, TPLF representatives were expected to operate within political boundaries established by the EPLF leadership and Isaias Afwerki.
Foreign assistance was allegedly subject to similar control.
Because weapons, funds and other resources often passed through EPLF-controlled routes, Asgede claims the EPLF was able to inspect shipments, retain sophisticated equipment and pass less valuable material to the TPLF.
Modern weapons could simply be declared unsuitable for TPLF forces and retained by the EPLF.
For Asgede, such practices demonstrate that the relationship was not merely military cooperation but a broader system of political, diplomatic and logistical dependency.
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ฆ๐๐ง ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ก๐๐ฅ
The greatest cost, however, was paid in lives.
Asgede claims that more than 20,000 Tigrayan fighters died in operations associated with the Sahel and that many thousands more were wounded or permanently disabled.
Whether every numerical estimate can be independently substantiated or not, his broader contention is unmistakable: Tigray paid disproportionately for an alliance managed by leaders who, in his view, failed to protect the interests of their own population.
He places particular responsibility on a small circle within the historic TPLF leadership, repeatedly naming Sebhat Nega and Giday Zeratsion, along with other senior figures.
๐ ๐๐๐ซ๐ง๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ
Asgede’s essay is not simply an account of history.
Its central purpose is to warn that, in his view, the same political pattern is re-emerging.
He accuses the faction associated with Debretsion Gebremichael of once again subordinating Tigrayan interests to Eritrean strategic calculations and of treating Tigrayan youth as expendable military manpower.
He compares the practice to the use of mercenary forces: young people provide the blood and labor while political leaders pursue deals from which others benefit.
The comparison is deliberately severe. Asgede argues that the current situation may even be worse than the past because, in his assessment, practices once concealed behind revolutionary rhetoric are now being pursued more openly.
His message to former TPLF commanders and senior officials is therefore direct: you have lived through this history before, and you know where it leads.
The previous generation, he argues, sacrificed Tigrayan fighters, civilians and resources to preserve an unequal relationship with the EPLF. Repeating the same strategy would amount not merely to another political mistake, but to the repetition of a historic betrayal.
For Asgede Gebreselassie, the lesson from decades of TPLF-EPLF relations is simple: alliances may be necessary, but no leadership has the right to purchase an ally’s survival with the lives, resources and future of its own people.
โ Asgede Gebreselassie
๐ธ๐๐๐ก๐๐โ๐ ๐๐๐ก๐: ๐โ๐๐ ๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ก๐ ๐ด๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐ ๐๐โ๐ ๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ก๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐กโ๐ โ๐๐ ๐ก๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐ โ๐๐ ๐๐๐ก๐ค๐๐๐ ๐กโ๐ ๐๐๐ฟ๐น ๐๐๐ ๐ธ๐๐ฟ๐น. ๐
๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ ๐ข๐๐๐ก๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐ข๐๐๐ , ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ค๐๐๐ก๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ก๐ , ๐๐๐ฃ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐ โ๐ข๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ ๐ข๐๐๐๐๐๐ , ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ก๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐กโ๐ ๐๐๐ก๐๐ฃ๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ฃ๐๐๐ข๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ก ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐กโ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ฆ๐ ๐ก๐๐ฅ๐ก ๐๐๐ โ๐๐ฃ๐ ๐๐๐ก ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ฆ ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐กโ๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ก๐๐๐. ย Abraha Belai (Journalist & Political analyst)