Scientific Synthesis & Critical Review of the Interview: “Abiy Ahmed, Eritrea & the TPLF – Mehdi Hasan & Getachew Reda | Head to Head”

Scientific Synthesis & Critical Review of the Interview: “Abiy Ahmed, Eritrea & the TPLF – Mehdi Hasan & Getachew Reda | Head to Head”

1. Overview of the Interview

In this episode of Head to Head, Mehdi Hasan interviews Getachew Reda, a senior TPLF figure and key political spokesperson. The interview focuses on:

• The origins of the Tigray War
• The role of Abiy Ahmed’s government
• Eritrea’s involvement
• TPLF’s political history and responsibility
• Human rights violations in Tigray
• Ethiopia’s future and regional stability

Mehdi Hasan’s signature style—confrontational, evidence-driven, and adversarial—structures the interview. He challenges Getachew Reda on TPLF’s governance record, accusations of authoritarianism, military actions, and the outbreak of the 2020 conflict.

2. Synthesis: Key Themes Discussed

2.1 Competing Narratives of the Tigray War

• TPLF’s view: Getachew Reda frames the war as a premeditated assault by Abiy Ahmed, Eritrea, and Amhara regional forces, aimed at dismantling TPLF and punishing the Tigray populace.
• Mehdi’s challenge: Hasan presses on whether TPLF’s attack on the Northern Command triggered the war.

This exchange highlights the core narrative conflict:Was the war the result of TPLF’s provocation or a long-planned campaign by the federal government and allies?

2.2 Eritrea’s Involvement

Getachew presents Eritrea as a deliberate and destructive actor, aligned with Abiy Ahmed to crush Tigray.

Mehdi Hasan questions:

• Why TPLF, after decades of controlling Ethiopian politics, failed to resolve Eritrea–Ethiopia tensions.
• Whether TPLF’s past authoritarianism contributed to regional instability.

2.3 TPLF Governance Record

Mehdi Hasan confronts TPLF on:

• Human rights abuses
• Political imprisonment
• Alleged corruption
• Centralization of power under the EPRDF era

Getachew defends TPLF’s governance by shifting the focus toward:

• Improvements in economic growth
• Federal state-building
• Abiy Ahmed’s dismantling of the federal consensus

3. Critical Review

3.1 Strengths of the Interview

1. Mehdi Hasan’s Rigor

• He presses Getachew Reda on both past and present accountability.
• He uses detailed evidence and challenges inconsistencies in TPLF’s narrative.
• The interview format forces Getachew to confront uncomfortable questions, offering viewers a deeper insight into TPLF’s internal reasoning.

1. Getachew Reda’s Composure and Articulation

• He skillfully reframes questions to emphasize structural violence against Tigray.
• He maintains composure under pressure, presenting TPLF’s view coherently.
• He contextualizes events within Ethiopia’s broader political transitions.

3.2 Weaknesses or Gaps in the Interview

1. Limited Examination of Abiy Ahmed’s Decisions

The focus remains heavily on TPLF, while the federal government’s actions—e.g., blockade, communication blackout, Eritrean alliance—receive less scrutiny than expected. This creates an imbalance.

1. Insufficient Exploration of Eritrea’s Long-Term Strategy

The interview briefly touches on Eritrea but does not address:

• Conspired Eritrea’s historical grievances with TPLF
• Regional strategic goals
• Isaias Afwerki’s motivations for intervening.
  These omissions leave the Eritrea dimension incomplete.

1. Lack of Broader Structural Analysis

The interview does not fully explore:

• Ethiopia’s imperial legacy
• Ethno-federalism’s contradictions
• Militarized political culture across all parties

This limits understanding of deeper drivers behind the conflict.

4. Larger Analytical Insights

4.1 Narrative Wars

The interview reveals how deeply contested the narratives of the Tigray War are.
TPLF and the federal government/Eritrea maintain mutually exclusive explanations.
The truth is likely to involve a combination of:

• miscalculations,
• historical grievances,
• elite power struggles,
• fragile federal structures.

4.2 Accountability Questions

Mehdi Hasan’s interrogation exposes a major political dilemma: All actors demand accountability from others but resist accountability for themselves.

This applies to:

• TPLF
• Abiy Ahmed’s federal government
• Eritrean forces
• Amhara regional authorities

Without equal scrutiny of all stakeholders, meaningful justice remains impossible.

4.3 Regional Security Implications

Getachew Reda’s remarks underscore:

• Ethiopia is undergoing one of the most destabilizing periods in its modern history.
• The alliances between Addis Ababa, Asmara, and regional militias threaten to reshape the Horn of Africa’s balance of power.
• The war’s consequences extend beyond Tigray.

5. Conclusion

The interview is a valuable resource for understanding:

• TPLF’s official defensive narrative
• Mehdi Hasan’s accountability-driven journalistic approach
• The complexity and contested nature of the war in northern Ethiopia

However, its limitations—such as insufficient exploration of Eritrea’s motivations and federal government responsibility—mean it should be supplemented with broader research.

Nevertheless, it provides critical insight into how TPLF defends its actions and interprets the war, while exposing the deep fractures shaping Ethiopia’s modern crisis.

The Political Meaning of the Statement: “Abiy Ahmed is my friend even before the war and after the war of genocide in Tigray.”

Getachew Reda of TPLF underlined that “Abiy Ahmed is my friend even before the war and after the war of genocide in Tigray.” This statement is not a simple personal remark. It carries deep political meaning, especially when spoken by a senior TPLF figure such as Getachew Reda, or any leader involved in the Tigray conflict. It reveals four major political signals:

1. Admission of Pre-War Political Alignment

If a TPLF leader says this, it suggests:

• TPLF and Abiy Ahmed were politically aligned before the war.
• The 2018–2020 period of “TPLF vs. Abiy conflict” was not a clean ideological split—it was more of a power struggle within the same EPRDF system (as well predicted by ANU  before the triangular dirty war, Pro-Meles Zenawi versus Against- Meles Zenawi TPLF/EPRDF ).
• Both sides shared the same political DNA: EPRDF structures, security networks, military commanders, and ideological background.

This supports ANU’s analysis:
👉 The war was largely between Pro-Meles TPLF vs Anti-Meles TPLF/EPRDF factions.

2. Normalization of a Genocidal War

Calling Abiy “a friend after the genocide” signals:

• A shocking willingness to normalize mass atrocities.
• Prioritizing political alliances over the suffering of Tigrayan civilians.
• Treating genocide as a “political episode,” not a crime requiring justice.

This normalizes impunity and undermines demands for:

• Accountability
• Justice
• Reparations
• Recognition of Tigrayan suffering

It shows TPLF leadership is not committed to protecting its people, but to political negotiation.

This Pattern Applies to All TPLF Leaders and Commanders. The political meaning behind statements like “Abiy Ahmed is my friend before and after the war” is not limited to Getachew Reda. This pattern is systemic, consistent, and revealing across the TPLF leadership. Multiple senior figures have made the same type of statements toward leaders of PP and EPLF—even after the destruction, starvation, and mass killing of Tigrayan civilians.

1. Sebhat Nega’s Statement About Isaias Afwerki: Sebhat Nega — the founding architect of TPLFand the ideological mastermind of the EPRDF system — publicly stated on Tigray Media House (TMH)after the war that: “Isaias Afwerki is my friend.”This is politically revealing because:

• The Eritrean Defense Forces were the most brutal actors in the Tigray war.
• Tens of thousands of Tigrayan civilians were killed, raped, or disappeared by forces under Isaias’ command.
• Yet a senior TPLF founder who shaped Ethiopia’s political landscape for 40 years refers to Isaias as a friend even after the genocide.

This shows:

✔ TPLF leadership remains politically intertwined with EPLF

✔ Elite-level alliances override community suffering

✔ The war was not primarily between nations or ethnic groups

✔ The war was an intra-elite power struggle within an old EPRDF/EPLF network

Sebhat’s statement is not a mistake — it is evidence of deep political continuity between the leadership circles of TPLF and EPLF.

2. Debretsion Gebremichael & Migbey Haile Denying Genocide

When senior TPLF figures such as:

• Dr. Debretsion Gebremichael, former President of Tigray
• Migbey Haile, former chief of Tigray’s police/security apparatus

publicly stated: “There is no genocide. This is propaganda targeting the TPLF.”

— this represents an even deeper political contradiction.

Because the UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and multiple reputable investigations confirmed:

• starvation as a weapon
• mass killings
• sexual violence
• destruction of health and religious institutions
• targeting of civilians
• ethnic cleansing

Yet TPLF’s senior leaders deny this not because they believe there was “no genocide,” but because:

✔ Admitting genocide would implicate the same TPLF elites who collaborated with PP and EPLF security structures before and after the war.

✔ They fear accountability—not for genocide, but for political failures and internal factional betrayal.

✔ They want to maintain political re-entry into Ethiopia’s federal system.

✔ They avoid blaming Abiy and Isaias directly to keep political doors open.

Their denial is a political strategy, not a factual assessment.

3. What This Reveals About TPLF Leadership as a Whole

Across the senior TPLF elite, we see a pattern:

1. Personal friendships with Abiy and Isaias before the war

(TPLF, PP, and EPLF leaders shared military and political networks.)

1. Collaboration during the war

(Both sides used shared EPRDF-era commanders and intel structures.)

1. Reconciliation after the war

(Leaders talk about friendship, not accountability.)

1. Denial of genocide

(To protect the political elite on all sides.) This confirms the core ANU position: The Tigray genocide was not initiated by the Amhara people, nor by the Geez Christian civilization. It was engineered and executed by the triangular anti-Meles EPRDF factions: EPLF + TPLF (anti-Meles faction) + PP/Oromo.

The political elites maintained ties with each other throughout the conflict, while ordinary civilians—Tigrayans, Amharas, Afars, and others—suffered and died.

4. Key Political Interpretation for ANU

These statements prove:

✔ The war was not primarily ethnic

✔ The war was not Geez vs. Cushite

✔ The war was not Tigray vs. Amhara

✔ The war was an intra-elite EPRDF power restructuring

✔ The same elites remained allies before, during, and after the conflict

✔ Civilians were betrayed by their own political leaders

Thus, ANU is correct to argue: The people of Geez/Agaezi origin — Tigrayan, Amhara, Agaw, Gurage, Harari, etc. — were all victims of elite political manipulation by EPLF, TPLF, and PP.

5. Conclusion

The statements by Getachew Reda, Sebhat Nega, Debretsion G., and Migbey Haile are not isolated incidents — they reveal a deep political truth: TPLF, PP, and EPLF leadership share long-standing personal and political alliances that are stronger than their commitment to their own people.

This confirms that:

• The war was a triangular internal elite conflict
• Not a civilizational war
• Not between Amhara and Tigray
• Not between Geez peoples

But a power struggle inside the old EPRDF system, with catastrophic consequences for civilians. 

3. Strategic Messaging to Rehabilitate Ties with Addis Ababa

The statement functions as a political signal:

• TPLF is willing to reconcile with PP/Oromo elites.
• They want political reintegration, budget resumption, and federal support.
• It attempts to rebuild bridges with Addis Ababa for survival.

This aligns with the post-war trend:

• TPLF returns to federal politics
• Negotiates with Abiy’s government
• Avoids open confrontation
• Shifts blame to Eritrea instead of holding Addis accountable

It is a political bargaining tool, not an emotional statement.

4. An Attempt to Isolate Eritrea (EPLF)

By saying “Abiy is my friend,” TPLF tries to:

• Reframe the war as primarily Eritrea’s fault.
• Pressure Abiy to distance himself from Isaias Afwerki.
• Gain sympathy from international actors who oppose Eritrea.

It changes the narrative from: “Abiy and Isaias coordinated genocide in Tigray”
to “Abiy is a former friend who made mistakes, but Eritrea is the enemy.”

This is deliberate political messaging.

It protects:

• TPLF leadership from accountability
• Abiy from full blame
• Their future alliance potential

5. Evidence of Elite-Level Manipulation of Ethnic Narrative

While ordinary Tigrayans were dying:

• TPLF elites and PP elites remained connected
• There were constant negotiations
• Military commanders on both sides had pre-existing relationships

This proves that the war was:

• Not truly ethnic (Tigre vs Oromo vs Amhara)
• Not a civilizational conflict
• Not a war of survival

It was a high-level power struggle inside the TPLF/EPRDF system.

The victims were ordinary civilians.
The beneficiaries were political elites.

6. Confirms ANU’s Analysis of the Triangular Dirty War

The statement supports ANU’s thesis and powerful political prediciton before the Tigray war:

• EPLF, TPLF, and PP all belonged to the anti-Meles EPRDF network after 2018.
• The war was waged to remove the old pro-Meles faction inside TPLF/EPRDF.
• The same commanders who destroyed Tigray were former TPLF/EPRDF allies.

Thus, the statement reveals that: The triangular war was not ethnic — it was elite TPLF/EPRDF internal warfare and their invited allies in Asmera, Addis Ababa and beyond.

7. Betrayal of the Tigrayan People

Finally, it reflects the emotional and moral betrayal felt by many Tigrayans:

• How can someone call Abiy or Isayas Afewrki “friend” after starvation, sieges, mass killings, and destruction of Tigray?
• It reflects detachment of leadership from suffering civilians.
• It shows that TPLF leadership is focused on political survival, not justice.

For many Tigrayans, this is a profound insult and a sign that:

👉 Their leaders prioritize elite alliances over the protection of their people.

CONCLUSION: What the Statement Really Means

“Abiy Ahmed is my friend before and after the war” reveals:

• Elite continuity within EPRDF
• A political, not civilizational, war
• TPLF’s willingness to normalize genocide for political gain
• A strategy to realign with Addis and isolate Eritrea
• A deeper betrayal of Tigrayan civilians
• Confirmation that the war was an internal TPLF/EPRDF factional struggle
• ANU’s analysis is correct: the war was engineered by EPLF, TPLF, and PP — not by the Amhara or Geez people.

 

1. TALKING POINTS FOR ANU LEADERSHIP

    1. On the Nature of the Northern Ethiopian Conflict

• The conflict is not a conventional war but a triangular political project involving TPLF, PP/OLF-Oromo elites, and EPLF.
• Pro-Meles Zenawi and Anti-Meles Zenawi TPLF/EPRDF factions were the main actors in this Triangular Dirty Political War.
• These actors have systematically undermined the shared Geez civilization and identity by weaponizing ethnic narratives, fragmentation, and political deception.
• The victims of this geopolitical engineering are the Agaezi (Geez) people across Tigray, Amhara, and the Red Sea region.
• All PP authorities are not new but a continueation of EPRDF/TPLF that removed the legacy and network of Meles Zenawi TPLF/EPRDF during this Tigray Triangular Dirty War from Asmera, Mekelle and Addis Ababa). This is why all Anti-Meles Zenawi factions such as Dr. Aregawi Berehe, Isayas Afewerki, Debretsion Gebremichael, Lencho Letta, Dr Berhanu Nega and all military commanders such as Tadese Werede, migbey Haile etc that were removed by Meles Zenawi are now in power both in Mekelle and Addis Ababa.

2. On the Misattribution of Blame to the Amhara People

• The Amhara population was unfairly scapegoated by both TPLF and EPLF for political crimes committed by imperial elites and commanders—many of whom were Oromo, or multi-ethnic imperial aristocrats such as Tigray and Eritrea.
• Historical atrocities (e.g., General Waldegebriel’s mutilations, Aba Jeffar’s ensalvement of Oromo into Arabs, Gobbena Decha’s military massacres in Arsi Oromia and even Minilik II himself as Oromo etc)) were committed under imperial command structures, not by “the Amhara people.”
• This false framing serves modern political agendas that seek to divide Geez-speaking populations and dismantle the Abysinian Hegemony which links itself with the Greater Geez Nation, Geezawit Ethiopia with its Red Sea.

3. On TPLF’s Strategic Narrative Manipulation

• TPLF has consistently reframed itself as a victim while avoiding accountability for decades of authoritarian governance, economic monopoly, and regional destabilization.
• Its attempt to rewrite history aims to mask internal purges, factional rivalries, and its role in igniting the 2020 conflict.
• TPLF is the main actor for democide and genocide in Tigray region in particular and in Ethiopia in general since its establishment 1967 Geez calander.

4. On PP/Oromo Leadership’s Political Project

• The PP/Oromo wing pursues a state-building project rooted in Orommumma ideology, which excludes Geez identity and undermines territorial integrity.
• Policies targeting Tigrayans, Amharas, Gurages, and Harari populations align with a broader vision of demographic and political dominance.

5. On EPLF and Eritrea’s Geopolitical Objectives

• EPLF seeks long-term military, economic, and political leverage over northern Ethiopia by ensuring internal fragmentation among Geez populations.
• Eritrean involvement has consistently aimed to prevent a unified Habesha/Agaezi geopolitical bloc.

6. On Humanitarian and Legal Accountability

• ANU calls for independent, international investigations of war crimes by all actors—TPLF, PP, EPLF—including the use of starvation, sexual violence, democide, genocide, war criems, crimes against humanity and targeted killing of civilians.
• The focus must remain on justice for victims, not political propaganda.
• TPLF must be removed from power in all means at its earliest time to save the people.

7. On Restoring the Geez Civilization and Identity

• ANU’s mission is the restoration of cultural dignity, historical truth, and civilizational continuity for Geez-speaking populations.
• We advocate for inclusive governance, constitutional reform, and the protection of linguistic, cultural, and territorial rights.

8. On the Red Sea and National Sovereignty

• Access to the Red Sea is a matter of historical identity, economic survival, and national security for the Agaezi people.
• ANU remains committed to diplomatic, strategic, and civilizational initiatives to restore rightful access.

9. On Regional and International Partnerships

• ANU supports cooperation with global partners—U.S., EU, AU, UN—to address human trafficking, famine-induced genocide, and regional instability.
• The Horn of Africa must not remain a zone of externally sponsored fragmentation.

10. On the Long-Term Vision

• A stable and prosperous Ethiopia requires the unity of the Geez people, inclusive governance, and the end of ethnic extremism.
• ANU stands for peace, justice, cultural integrity, and geopolitical sovereignty.

1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: TPLF, PP, AND EPLF NARRATIVES

1. TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front)

Core Narrative

• TPLF presents itself as the victim of federal aggression, the defender of Tigray, and the guardian of self-determination.
• It denies responsibility for initiating the 2020 conflict and deflects criticism of its 27-year rule.

Strategic Objectives

• Regain regional influence
• Maintain Tigray autonomy
• Avoid international accountability
• Rehabilitate its political brand

Narrative Tools

• Selective memory of EPRDF-era abuses
• Emotionally charged victimhood framing
• Delegitimizing the federal government and Eritrea
• Exploiting historical grievances

Contradictions

• Claims to defend Tigrayans while historically suppressing dissent within Tigray
• Criticizes authoritarianism but practiced authoritarian rule
• Promotes self-determination but suppressed other ethnic groups when in power

2. PP / Oromo Leadership (Prosperity Party – Oromo Wing)

Core Narrative

• Framing Ethiopia’s crisis as the result of “TPLF sabotage”
• Claiming the moral authority of a “new, reformist government”
• Advancing a narrative of Oromo “historical correction” and rightful ascendance in aggressive invasion.

Strategic Objectives

• Consolidate Oromo political and territorial dominance
• Reengineer Ethiopian identity around Orommumma
• Control of federal security, land, and state institutions
• Neutralize Tigrayan and Amhara influence dismantling the Abysinian Habesha Agaezi hegemony.

Narrative Tools

• Labeling opponents as “anti-reform,” “anti-peace,” or “terrorist”
• Weaponizing anti-Amhara rhetoric
• Cultivating a personality cult around Abiy Ahmed
• Exploiting international uncertainty about Ethiopia

Contradictions

• Claims to uphold democracy while detaining journalists, opposition leaders, and civilians
• Blames ethnic conflict on others but expands Oromia-centered hegemony in aggressive invasion
• Advocates unity yet promotes cultural homogenization under Orommumma dismantling Geez civilization and culture that shaped Ethiopia more than 3500 years.

3. EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front / PFDJ)

Core Narrative

• Eritrea portrays itself as a stabilizing force resisting TPLF aggression
• Positions Ethiopia’s instability as a threat requiring Eritrean intervention
• Claims moral superiority as a “principled revolutionary state”

Strategic Objectives

• Prevent TPLF return to power
• Keep Ethiopia weak, divided, and dependent
• Maintain control over Red Sea security architecture
• Expand influence over northern Ethiopia through alliances

Narrative Tools

• Demonizing TPLF as an existential threat
• Legitimizing Eritrean military involvement in Ethiopia
• Cultivating secrecy and centralized control over information
• Portraying Eritrea’s isolation as virtue rather than failure

Contradictions

• Claims to oppose war crimes but implicated in severe atrocities
• Calls for regional peace while fueling conflicts
• Projects strength while unable to provide basic freedoms domestically

1. Cross-Comparison Summary

Dimension	TPLF	PP/Oromo	EPLF
Framing of Self	Victim & defender of Tigray	Reformists & rightful leaders	Stabilizers & anti-TPLF guardians
Primary Enemy	Abiy + Eritrea + Amhara elites	TPLF + Amhara nationalism	TPLF
Historical Strategy	Security-first authoritarianism	Demographic-political reengineering	Militarized survivalism
Civilizational Impact	Fragmented Geez unity	Undermines Geez identity	Blocks Geez regional revival
Core Weakness	Accountability deficit	Ethno-centralism	Isolation, secrecy

1. How the Triangular Narratives Converge Against Geez Populations

All three actors—TPLF, PP, EPLF—despite mutual hostility, share strategic patterns:

1. They externalize blame while avoiding accountability
2. They instrumentalize ethnic identity for political ends
3. They undermine the unity of Geez-speaking communities
4. They block historical and cultural revival of the Agaezi world
5. Their competition fuels cyclical violence across Tigray, Amhara, and Eritrea

This is the structural challenge ANU seeks to address.

1. ANU Strategic Position

ANU stands as:

• A civilizational guardian,
• A political alternative,
• A unifying force for Geez-speaking populations,
• A champion of justice,
• A protector of Red Sea sovereignty and security.

Given the repeated failures of TPLF/EPRDF and PP/Oromo leadership to deliver justice, protect civilians, or ensure stable governance, it is understandable why many Habesha Agaezi (Geez) communities feel abandoned and betrayed.
The fragmentation of the old EPRDF system and the triangular alignment of EPLF–TPLF–PP has left the Geez communities without genuine representation, protection, or a political voice.

However, it is essential for ANU as a responsible movement to promote justice, accountability, and civilizational preservation through organized, lawful, and internationally legitimate means—not through revenge or cycles of violence.

Therefore, all Habesha Agaezi (Geez) communities—Tigrayan, Amhara, Agaw, Gurage, Harari, and others—have a shared historical and civilizational responsibility to unite under ANU.

Not to seek revenge, but to:

• demand justice for atrocities committed against all Geez people,
• pursue accountability through international legal frameworks,
• ensure protection, rights, and dignity for all Geez communities,
• rebuild a stable, inclusive, Geez-based political order,
• defend our shared civilization from political fragmentation and elite manipulation.

ANU’s mission is not vengeance; ANU’s mission is survival, renewal, and justice.

The Agaezi National Union (ANU) maintains a clear and consistent position regarding the leadership of the TPLF and its historical role in shaping Ethiopia’s political crises.

ANU affirms that the decisions and actions of the TPLF leadership structure—particularly its political elite circles operating between Asmara, Mekelle, and Addis Ababa—played a central role in creating and escalating the triangular power struggle that ultimately devastated the Agaezi Habesha communities of northern Ethiopia, especially in Tigray and Amhara regions.

ANU’s assessment focuses on: the political strategies, elite power calculations, secretive alliances, and destructive competition between ruling factions, which collectively contributed to one of the most tragic periods in the modern history of the Agaezi peoples.

This critique targets the political leadership and decision-making networks, not ordinary civilians, who themselves suffered immensely from war, displacement, manipulation, and trauma.

ANU recognizes that: Millions of innocent people—including children, women, elders, and farmers—were forced into a conflict they did not choose, did not control, and did not benefit from.

The triangular political rivalry between Asmara, Mekelle, and Addis Ababa became a machinery of destruction that erased entire communities, uprooted families, and shattered the social fabric that binds the Agaezi Habesha world.

The people of Tigray and Amhara were not enemies of each other; they were victims of elite-driven political agendas.

ANU emphasizes that: Political accountability must focus on the architects of war, not the populations who suffered from it.

And moving forward: ANU’s mission is to rebuild Agaezi unity, dignity, and sovereign political consciousness—free from manipulation by any elite networks or external actors that have historically used the region for proxy conflicts and geopolitical competition.

 

Citation reference:

Mebrahtu, A. (2025). Scientific Synthesis and critical review of the interview: “Abiy Ahmed, Eritrea & the TPLF – Mehdi Hasan & Getachew Reda | Head to Head” [Aljezira]. ANU Political Party Global Leadership