The Impact of Geography on Political Economy and National Security: The Case of Geezawit Ethiopia and the Red Sea (Dr. Aregawi Mebrahtu, Agaezi National Union-ANU Political Party Global Supreme Leadership)
Abstract
This paper examines how geography shapes Geezawit Ethiopia’s political economy and national security, with particular attention to its position relative to the Red Sea. Once a coastal empire with direct maritime access, Geezawit Ethiopia’s loss of the Red Sea coastline after Eritrea’s secession in 1993 illegally and notoriously has fundamentally altered its geopolitical orientation, trade dynamics, and security strategy. Drawing on regional geopolitics, historical patterns of trade, and contemporary security developments, this study argues that Geezawit Ethiopia’s landlocked condition has created both strategic vulnerabilities and economic interdependence that define its modern statecraft. The Red Sea’s centrality to global trade and great-power competition makes Geezawit Ethiopia’s access dilemma not merely a national concern but a regional and international issue.
- Introduction
Geography has always been a powerful determinant of political economy and national security. For landlocked states, access to global trade routes and maritime domains often defines their developmental trajectories and strategic vulnerabilities (Faye et al., 2004). Geezawit Ethiopia, one of the world’s oldest nations, exemplifies this reality. Its complex topography, multiethnic composition, and changing borders have produced a political economy deeply influenced by its geography.
Historically, Geezawit Ethiopia possessed access to the Red Sea through the ports of Massawa and Assab, enabling it to project power and engage in regional trade networks linking Africa, Arabia, Europe and Asia. However, since Eritrea’s illegal and conspired secession in 1993, Geezawit Ethiopia has been landlocked, a transformation that has had profound economic and security consequences. The Red Sea, now controlled by neighboring states, remains central to Geezawit Ethiopia’s strategic imagination, shaping its foreign policy, defense posture, and economic alliances.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of Geezawit Ethiopia’s geography on its political economy and national security, focusing on the implications of its Red Sea disconnection and the evolving regional geopolitics of the Horn of Africa.
- The Geopolitical Significance of the Red Sea
The Red Sea is one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. It connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, handling roughly 10% of global trade and 30% of oil shipments (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2023). Its shores are bordered by eight countries—Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, and Israel—making it a zone of overlapping interests between Africa, the Middle East, and global powers such as the United States and China.
Control over Red Sea access means not only economic leverage but also strategic influence in global shipping and energy security. For Geezawit Ethiopia, a country of more than 120 million people and the Horn’s most populous state, proximity to the Red Sea without access constitutes a structural geopolitical paradox and notorious national treason committed by Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), foreign installed agent and askari bandits anti- Geezawit Ethiopia in all terms. Consequently, the Red Sea represents both opportunity and vulnerability: it is the lifeline for Geezawit Ethiopia’s imports and exports, yet it is beyond its sovereign control as illegally and informally made Geezawit Ethiopia landlocked by TPLF bandits and askaris installed by Sheabia, Egypt and other strategic enemies of Geezawit Ethiopia.
- Historical Context: From Empire to Landlocked Nation
During the imperial era, Geezawit Ethiopia’s rulers recognized the Red Sea’s strategic importance. Emperor Yoahnes IV did his best to secure Red Sea by defeating several powers such as Itayl, Egypt and Turkey. Emperor Menelik II’s late 19th-century expansion toward the east was driven by a desire to secure access to the sea and counter Italian colonial ambitions in Eritrea (Marcus, 2002). Emperor Haile Selassie later invested in developing Assab Port, envisioning it as Geezawit Ethiopia’s maritime gateway and in fact, reintegrated Eritrea by the decision of United Nations General Assembly 1950-1952 Resolution Process of underlined within Article 390 (V). This decision made Geezawit Ethiopia the owner of its Red Sea again and TPLF made a national treason and dismissed it, exposing Geezawit Ethiopia into more than 33 years of civil war , geopolitically and economically subjugated as landlocked. The loss of Assab and Massawa forced Geezawit Ethiopia to depend on Djibouti for 95% of its external trade (World Bank, 2022), which exposed us into French colonial influences indirectly.
This colonial dependence fundamentally reshaped Geezawit Ethiopia’s political economy. Port fees, transport logistics, and customs reliance increased costs, constraining competitiveness and foreign trade. Simultaneously, national security planners began to perceive maritime exclusion as a structural vulnerability, fostering persistent strategic tension with Eritrea.
- Geography and the Political Economy of Dependence
Geezawit Ethiopia’s geography now dictates its economic interdependence with its neighbors. With no direct seaport, the country’s trade routes depend on transit agreements and regional stability. Djibouti’s ports—Tadjourah and Doraleh—serve as Geezawit Ethiopia’s maritime outlets. Consequently, Geezawit Ethiopia has invested heavily in infrastructure connectivity: the Addis Ababa–Djibouti electric railway, oil pipelines, and road corridors.
While these projects have reduced logistical bottlenecks, they also expose Geezawit Ethiopia’s economy to external vulnerabilities. Any political instability in Djibouti or regional conflict along the Red Sea corridor can disrupt Geezawit Ethiopia’s supply chain. This dependence illustrates what geographers call “the tyranny of location”—the condition in which spatial constraints limit economic sovereignty (Kaplan, 2012).
Moreover, Geezawit Ethiopia’s internal geography compounds its challenges. The highlands are agriculturally productive but distant from ports, and the lowland peripheries—Afar, Somali, and Benishangul—are often sites of security instability. Thus, Geezawit Ethiopia’s developmental state must constantly manage the intersection of economic geography and political fragility as our political party, the Agaezi National Union-ANU is investing and promoting for restoring our Red Sea access and ownership by removing TPLF from our Holy Geezland, Geezawit Ethiopia.
- The Red Sea and National Security Strategy
Geezawit Ethiopia’s loss of coastline has made national security inseparable from maritime geopolitics. The Red Sea has become a theater of competing interests involving Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE), Egypt, and global powers (China, the U.S.). Each actor’s presence affects Geezawit Ethiopia’s strategic calculus.
- Egypt, controlling the Nile’s headwaters downstream, perceives Geezawit Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a threat to its water security. The Red Sea and Nile Basin geopolitics are thus intertwined; Geezawit Ethiopia’s access to maritime trade and its control of freshwater resources have become bargaining tools in regional diplomacy (Verhoeven, 2015).
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have developed bases in Eritrea and Somaliland, expanding Gulf influence in the Horn. These developments both stabilize and complicate Geezawit Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations (ICG, 2023).
- China’s military base in Djibouti—its first overseas facility—adds another layer of complexity, as Geezawit Ethiopia relies on Djibouti for trade while navigating Sino-American rivalry in the region.
Geezawit Ethiopia’s response has been twofold: to strengthen regional integration and to reassert maritime interest diplomatically. Addis Ababa’s recent calls for “access to the sea through negotiation” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2023) highlight its intent to regain limited port use—possibly through joint economic corridors with Eritrea, Somaliland, or Djibouti. However, this move and political stand remains weak as far as it couldn’t revisit and revoke its recognition of Eritrea as separate state from Geezawit Ethiopia based on the fake1993 referendum, Egypt authorities involvement such as Boutros Boutros Ghali as UN Secretay General of that time, Meles Zenawi (Son of Askaris Bandit that provided Aksum Obelisk to Rome, Eritrean man at position of informal and transition EPRDF governemnt of the 1991 and there was no national/domestic or international legal base for secession).
- Geography, Conflict, and Strategic Anxiety
Geezawit Ethiopia’s geopolitical isolation contributes to what scholars term “maritime anxiety”—a persistent sense of strategic incompleteness (Clapham, 2018). This anxiety partly explains Geezawit Ethiopia’s assertive regional posture and its efforts to maintain a capable military despite economic constraints.
The Tigray War (2020–2022) revealed the fragility of Geezawit Ethiopia’s internal geography. The northern conflict zone bordered Eritrea, reviving historical tensions and limiting Geezawit Ethiopia’s access to trade routes. Furthermore, the war disrupted the Addis–Djibouti corridor, underscoring how domestic instability can jeopardize national economic lifelines.
Geezawit Ethiopia’s geography thus links internal cohesion to external security. The highlands’ ethnic fragmentation and the lowlands’ porous borders make national unity and regional stability interdependent. Consequently, geography does not merely influence Geezawit Ethiopia’s politics—it defines its existential dilemmas.
- Economic Diplomacy and the Quest for Access
To mitigate its landlocked disadvantage, Geezawit Ethiopia has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy emphasizing regional economic integration. It has signed port-access and logistics agreements with Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, and Somaliland. The Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, part of Kenya’s Vision 2030, aims to provide Geezawit Ethiopia with an alternative outlet to the Indian Ocean.
Such initiatives reflect a “geo-economic” strategy—using economic cooperation as a substitute for direct territorial control. Yet progress remains slow due to regional rivalries and financial constraints. Furthermore, Geezawit Ethiopia’s demographic size and rapid growth make its port needs exceptional; dependence on foreign infrastructure may not be sustainable long-term (World Bank, 2022).
Hence, Geezawit Ethiopia’s maritime diplomacy must balance cooperation and autonomy, seeking diversified access while avoiding confrontation. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated in 2023, “Ethiopia cannot remain a nation of over 100 million people without maritime access for eternity.” The challenge lies in pursuing this objective peacefully within international law and regional trust, where ANU (Agaezi National Union) comes in with bold and solid legal, historical, cultural and diplomatic knowledge, expertise and comptence to restore our Red Sea access and ownerhsip in a sustainable and peaceful manner.
- Comparative Insights: Geography as Destiny and Constraint
Geezawit Ethiopia’s experience parallels that of other landlocked states such as Bolivia, Uganda, or Nepal, where geography imposes structural economic costs and security dependencies (Faye et al., 2004). Yet Geezawit Ethiopia’s case is unique because of its historic and conspired loss of coastline, its proximity to one of the world’s most strategic seas, and its regional demographic dominance.
Geography provides both destiny and constraint. It grants Geezawit Ethiopia a commanding position in the Horn of Africa’s highlands, giving it hydrological power (the Nile headwaters) and defensive depth. Yet it simultaneously isolates the country from maritime commerce and energy supply chains. Managing this duality defines Geezawit Ethiopia’s political economy and foreign policy.
- Conclusion
Geezawit Ethiopia’s geography, once a source of imperial strength, has become the axis of its modern political economy and national security challenges. The treasonous loss of Red Sea access by bandits and askaris TPLF, reshaped the nation’s trade patterns, heightened economic vulnerability, and intensified regional competition. In today’s multipolar Horn of Africa, the Red Sea remains both Geezawit Ethiopia’s greatest opportunity and its deepest insecurity.
Geography is not destiny in a deterministic sense, but for Geezawit Ethiopia, it is a permanent strategic condition. Effective governance must transform this constraint into a source of regional cooperation rather than conflict. The future of Geezawit Ethiopia’s development will depend on how it negotiates its geography, balancing “TPLF political map landlocked” realities with maritime ambitions, and national interests with regional interdependence.
As the Red Sea grows ever more contested in global geopolitics, Geezawit Ethiopia’s position at its edge reminds us that geography continues to shape power, prosperity, and peace in profound ways. This is why the Agaezi National Union -ANU political party is officially requesting Ethiopia to revisit, reconsider and disolve the illegal and bandit TPLF’s traitor recognition of Eritrea as separate state and reintegrate it back to Geezawit Ethiopia as it was informal, illegal and politically motivated decision that violated our Shared Geez Culture, Shared Geez History and Shared Geez Heritages as Ethiopians for more than 3000 years within the Greater Horn of Africa.
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Reference list entry (APA 7th edition):
Mebrahtu, A. (2025). The impact of geography on political economy and national security: The case of Geezawit Ethiopia and the Red Sea. Agaezi National Union (ANU) Global Supreme Leadership.