TPLF Hostility and Control Toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC): Historical, Political, and Institutional Analysis . Dr. Aregawi Mebrahtu ANU Global Supreme Leadership – Geneva, Switzerland

TPLF Hostility and Control Toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC): Historical, Political, and Institutional Analysis

Dr. Aregawi Mebrahtu

ANU Global Supreme Leadership – Geneva, Switzerland

Abstract

The relationship between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) has been deeply intertwined with the political history of northern Ethiopia. This paper examines evidence suggesting that the TPLF—during its armed insurgency and subsequent political dominance—actively pursued policies that weakened or subordinated the EOTC. The analysis explores four major areas of tension: reduction of Church influence during the liberation struggle, systematic co-option and repression of clergy, loss of institutional autonomy, and ideological framing of the Church as a political threat. While evidence supports claims of hostility and control, the paper also examines counterarguments and contextual factors to provide an academically balanced assessment. The study contributes to broader debates on the intersection of religion, nationalism, and political power in Ethiopia.

Introduction

The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) has historically served as one of the central pillars of Ethiopian cultural identity, political legitimacy, and social organization. For centuries, the Church functioned not only as a spiritual institution but also as a landowner, educator, and mediator of royal authority (Henze, 2000). Against this backdrop, the rise of armed liberation movements in the late twentieth century—particularly the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—reshaped the relationships between state, society, and religious authority.

The TPLF, founded in 1975 during the early years of the Ethiopian civil war, sought to construct a new political order aligned with ethno-nationalist demands and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Its political vision often conflicted with the historical power of the Church, particularly in Tigray where EOTC institutions were deeply entrenched. Scholars argue that, to consolidate its authority, the TPLF adopted policies aimed at weakening the Church’s influence, controlling clergy, and restructuring religious life to align with its ideological priorities (Aregawi, 2011; Young, 1997).

This paper examines four major areas of evidence supporting the claim that the TPLF acted in ways hostile or controlling toward the EOTC:

Reduction of the Church’s influence during the armed struggle

Co-option and repression of clergy and church leaders

Loss of institutional autonomy and religious assets

Perception of the Church as a political threat

Each section presents historical and scholarly evidence while integrating counterarguments and contextual complexity.

Historical Background: The Church and the Liberation Movement

Before discussing TPLF-specific policies, it is important to understand the historical context. The EOTC’s longstanding role in legitimizing Ethiopian rulers made it an inherent political actor, whether consciously or not. Its influence in the northern highlands—especially Tigray—extended across social, economic, and cultural life. The Marxist-influenced liberation movements, including the TPLF and EPLF, viewed such traditional institutions as barriers to revolutionary transformation (Tronvoll, 2010).

In its early years, the TPLF was ideologically aligned with the leftist currents of the Cold War era, which frequently portrayed religious authority as an extension of feudalism. Consequently, the movement saw EOTC institutions as sources of “traditionalism” that could impede mobilization among rural peasants (Aregawi, 2011). This ideological foundation shaped many of the TPLF’s early decisions regarding the Church.

Reduction of Church Influence During the Armed Struggle

During its insurgency, the TPLF sought to restructure rural governance in Tigray through the creation of local revolutionary committees. These bodies replaced traditional elders, Church-linked councils, and local clergy. Church lands were confiscated or redistributed to peasants, undermining the economic basis of ecclesiastical power (Young, 1997).

Land Expropriation and Loss of Social Authority

Church lands—including agricultural holdings, forests, and income-generating properties—were central to the institution’s role in rural communities. Their expropriation significantly weakened the Church, aligning with TPLF’s broader strategy of dismantling what it viewed as “feudal remnants” (Aregawi, 2011).

Furthermore, the Church’s role in education and conflict mediation diminished as TPLF cadres assumed these responsibilities. This shift reduced the Church’s direct influence on public life and replaced it with revolutionary structures that promoted secular, nationalist ideology.

Public Perception

Interviews and oral histories collected by Girma (2012) suggest that many Tigrayan peasants perceived the TPLF’s actions as an attack on religious tradition, even if the movement framed them as necessary for modernization.

Co-option and Repression of Clergy and Church Leadership

A second major theme in the literature involves the TPLF’s attempts to control clergy rather than eliminate them. Scholars argue that this strategy combined co-optation, intimidation, and selective recruitment to ensure religious institutions aligned with political objectives (Tronvoll, 2010). TPLF authorities strategically utilized the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church both as a source of revenue and as an intelligence network. Church lands, tithes, and other assets were redirected to support party and military operations, while clergy and parish networks were monitored and, in some cases, co-opted to report on local political sentiment. These practices reinforced the subordination of religious authority to the party and contributed to perceptions of the Church as both a target and instrument of political control.

Installation of Politically Loyal Clergy

Several studies document the appointment of priests who were sympathetic to the movement or directly affiliated with TPLF structures (Berhe, 2004). These clergy often acted as intermediaries between the movement and local populations, helping to legitimize TPLF authority.

Restrictions on Religious Activity

Church leaders critical of the movement reportedly faced pressure, surveillance, or marginalization. Some were removed from their posts or relocated to prevent opposition (Girma, 2012). Tronvoll (2010) emphasizes that such tactics were not universal but targeted strategic areas where clergy influence was politically significant.

Suppression of Dissident Narratives

The TPLF’s information control strategies extended to religious spheres. Sermons or teachings deemed “politically divisive” could be restricted. This demonstrates a broader trend: religious expression was tolerated only insofar as it did not challenge the movement’s political agenda.

Pressure on Religious Figures and Loss of Institutional Autonomy

Numerous accounts describe instances where clergy were pressured to support TPLF activities, including mobilization campaigns, dissemination of political messages, or legitimization of revolutionary policies. Although these accounts vary in reliability, they align with broader patterns of institutional control.

Forced Participation and Coercion

Girma (2012) reports cases of priests being compelled to contribute resources, provide shelter, or participate in political meetings. In some instances, refusal invited punitive measures, including social ostracization or administrative penalties.

Erosion of Church Independence

Institutional autonomy was compromised as TPLF embedded itself in religious administration. Church festivals, processions, and community rituals increasingly required approval or oversight from local revolutionary committees (Berhe, 2004).

This merging of political and religious governance created a structural dependence that persisted even after the TPLF and EPRDF assumed national power in 1991.

Viewing the EOTC as a Political Threat

For many observers, TPLF’s actions were driven by a deeper ideological perception: that the EOTC represented an alternative source of authority capable of mobilizing opposition. Because the Church had a long history of legitimizing Ethiopian rulers, it was seen as a symbolic and institutional rival in the struggle for political legitimacy (Henze, 2000).

National Legitimacy and Ethno-nationalist Tensions

The TPLF’s ethno-nationalist agenda sought to redefine Ethiopian identity away from imperial or pan-Orthodox narratives. The Church’s association with Ethiopian unity made it a perceived obstacle to ethnically decentralized federalism.

Fear of Religious Mobilization

TPLF leaders often worried that clergy could mobilize resistance, either in support of rival factions or in defense of traditional structures (Young, 1997). This led to policies designed to neutralize the Church’s political influence, even while tolerating its spiritual role.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that the TPLF pursued a multifaceted strategy that, intentionally or not, weakened and subordinated the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, particularly in Tigray. Through expropriation of Church lands, co-option of clergy, suppression of dissent, and ideological framing of the Church as a political rival, the movement significantly altered the historical balance between religious and political authority.

However, the TPLF’s relationship with the Church must be understood within the broader context of revolutionary ideology, ethnic politics, and state formation. While hostility and control were evident, the relationship also contained elements of pragmatic coexistence and institutional adaptation.

The Church-state dynamics explored here remain central to understanding Ethiopia’s contemporary political landscape, where religious identity, national identity, and political power continue to intersect in transformative and contested ways.

 

Revolutionary Atheism and Anti-Religious Rhetoric in the Early TPLF

Introduction

An important aspect of understanding TPLF’s early relationship with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) involves examining the ideological environment in which the movement was born. The TPLF emerged in the mid-1970s under the influence of global Marxist-Leninist revolutionary thought, which explicitly rejected religion as a tool of class oppression. This ideological background contributed to the development of anti-religious rhetoric, slogans, and attitudes that shaped interactions between the TPLF, local clergy, and religious communities in Tigray.

1. The Meaning of the Slogan: “There Is No God… Only Victory to the Masses”

Among the expressions attributed to early TPLF fighters is the slogan:

“There is no God; never say besemam or bisemelahi; say only ‘victory to the masses.’”

Although this phrase was never an official TPLF motto, it reflects a widely documented revolutionary attitude. The slogan’s elements represent core principles of Marxist revolutionary thought:

“There is no God” — atheist rejection of divine authority

“Do not say besemam or bisemelahi” — rejection of Orthodox Christian and Muslim invocation formulas

“Victory to the masses” — affirmation that liberation is achieved by human collective struggle, not by divine intervention

Young (1997) and Aregawi (2011) argue that such rhetoric was intended to break the hold of traditional religious identity, which the movement saw as a barrier to revolutionary consciousness. These anti-religious sentiments were particularly provocative in Ethiopia, where daily life and speech are deeply infused with religious language.

2. Revolutionary Atheism in TPLF Political Culture

During its formative years, the TPLF adopted ideological principles drawn from Marxism-Leninism and Maoist theory. Such movements frequently promoted state atheism, discouraged clerical authority, and advocated for the construction of a secular, revolutionary citizenry (Tronvoll, 2010).

1. Rejection of Religious Authority

Under this ideological framework, religious institutions were viewed as:

“feudal remnants,”

instruments of class domination,

obstacles to political modernization (Berhe, 2004).

This explains why early TPLF cadres often discouraged religious expressions, teachings, or rituals that conflicted with movement ideology.

1. Redefining Social Identity

“Victory to the masses” replaced religious blessing formulas, symbolizing a shift from faith-based legitimacy to people-based legitimacy.

This reflects Marx’s thesis that liberation comes through human agency, not divine salvation.

3. Anti-Religious Slogans in Regional Liberation Movements (TPLF & EPLF)

It is crucial to situate TPLF’s rhetoric within the broader context of regional revolutionary movements.

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)

The EPLF—ideologically close to TPLF in its early years—also employed slogans discouraging religious expression. EPLF fighters were encouraged to avoid religious blessing formulas and instead use revolutionary expressions such as:

“Nsu hgus iyu” (“The people are the power”)

“Awet n’hafash” (“Victory to the masses”)

According to Pool (2001) and Iyob (1995), EPLF leadership believed religion promoted passivity and obedience, which contradicted its revolutionary mission.

Shared Revolutionary Atheism

Both movements:

rejected divine intercession

discouraged clergy from influencing public behavior

promoted secular revolutionary identity

viewed the masses—not God—as the source of victory

This shared ideological foundation shaped the political-religious culture of northern Ethiopia and Eritrea.

4. Social and Cultural Impact on Tigrayan Communities

The rejection of “besemam” and “bisemelahi” was not merely theological — it carried profound cultural implications.

1. Alienation of Local Clergy

Priests reported that early TPLF actions and slogans weakened their authority, discouraged religious gatherings, or undermined traditional rituals (Girma, 2012).

1. Disruption of Religious Language

In Ethiopian culture, expressions invoking God are foundational to everyday speech. Denying such expressions represented a symbolic attack on:

Orthodox Christian heritage,

Muslim devotional language,

and long-standing communal identity.

This contributed to social tension and mistrust between portions of Tigrayan society and the revolutionary movement.

5. TPLF’s Later Shift Away from Anti-Religious Rhetoric

By the late 1980s and after 1991, as political strategy evolved, TPLF distance itself from overt atheistic rhetoric.

Reasons for moderation:

Desire for political legitimacy

Need for nationwide support

Inclusion of religious elites in governance

Introduction of constitutional religious freedom

Tronvoll (2010) notes that the movement’s pragmatic approach reduced open hostility toward religion but did not fully eliminate earlier patterns of control.

Conclusion: Ideology, Slogan, and Legacy

The phrase “there is no God… victory to the masses” encapsulates the ideological hostility that characterized the TPLF’s early relationship with religion. While not an official motto, it reflects broader revolutionary attitudes shaped by Marxist thought and reinforced by anti-feudal rhetoric.

This anti-religious language contributed to:

weakening clergy authority,

transforming community norms,

and deepening tensions between TPLF and the Orthodox Church.

Understanding this slogan is essential to understanding the broader ideological forces that conditioned TPLF–EOTC relations during the late twentieth century.

Based on the historical evidence, testimonies, and scholarly analyses presented in this paper, it is clear that successive TPLF leadership circles developed political strategies that were frequently antagonistic toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) and toward Amhara communities. The policies, ideological campaigns, armed actions, and governance systems implemented by the TPLF at various periods contributed to widespread suffering, loss of life, displacement, erosion of dignity, and long-term socio-cultural damage for millions of Ethiopians.

While ordinary Tigrayans should never be conflated with the actions of TPLF political elites, the institutional behavior of the TPLF as a ruling party and armed movement over the past five decades produced patterns that many Ethiopians — particularly Orthodox Christians and Amhara communities — experienced as targeted hostility. These historical patterns warrant serious scholarly attention, accountability mechanisms, and reconciliation efforts.

 Political Meaning of the Slogan/Statement by Weldeselase Nega, TPLF Criminal and Democider … “we have destroyed the Orthodox Church and the Amhara” — as representative of TPLF under Sebhat Nega, it carries a few implied political messages:

1. Erasure of Historical-Institutional Power

The Orthodox Church in Ethiopia — especially the EOTC — has historically been deeply linked to political legitimacy, national identity, and social order. To declare its destruction is to reject that legacy.

Politically, this signals a break with the old imperial/feudal order (which many in TPLF saw as dominated by Amhara elites), replacing religious-national legitimacy with a new, revolutionary, ethnically-based legitimacy, while TPLF are the most corrupted kleptocracy tyrannies by themeselves. Kleptocracy  is a term used in political science to describe a system of government in which officials use state power to steal public resources for personal enrichment. Here is the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT; is the best example of kleptocracy TPLF criminals and demociders.

Formal Definition of a kleptocracy is:

a government ruled by thieves,

where corruption is systemic and institutionalized,

and where political elites exploit national wealth at the expense of the public.

Its Key Features are:

Systematic corruption – bribery, embezzlement, and diversion of public funds.

State capture – political elites control institutions (courts, police, legislature) to protect their wealth.

Lack of accountability – no real checks and balances; oversight bodies are weakened.

Concentration of wealth – leaders, their families, and loyal networks accumulate disproportionate resources.

Weak rule of law – laws exist but are not applied fairly; enforcement is selective.

Repression of critics – journalists, activists, and opposition groups are silenced.

These are all typical characteriostics of TPLF military junta tyrants and criminal genociders.

2. Ethno-nationalist Re-definition of Identity & Power

By pairing the Church with the Amhara — and saying both must be destroyed — the statement casts Orthodox Christianity and Amhara identity as inseparable pillars of a past order.

That implies the TPLF’s aim isn’t just political power, but restructuring the national identity — from multi-ethnic/religious imperial Ethiopia toward a Tigrayan ethno-political order.

3. Delegitimizing Opposition & Historic Enemies

Such a declaration would serve to delegitimize any resistance from Orthodox-Christian or Amhara communities by framing them as reactionary relics tied to oppression.

Politically, it provides ideological pretext for suppressing dissent, confiscating church lands/assets, or targeting Amhara populations in areas under TPLF control.

4. Justifying Structural Reform or Violence

If the Church and “Amhara rule” are painted as oppressive, abolishing them becomes a revolutionary justice — not repression. This rhetoric can morally justify forced land redistribution, cultural suppression, or even ethnic/ religious persecution.

That kind of statement, if widely circulated among cadres, signals readiness for radical social transformation — potentially including coercive measures against former elites and their associated institutions.

Viewing the EOTC as a Political Threat

Beyond ideology, TPLF viewed the Church as a potential rival for political legitimacy.

Historical Rivalry: The EOTC has long played a role in legitimizing rulers. A secular, ethno-nationalist movement naturally saw this as a challenge (Henze, 2000).

Fear of Clerical Mobilization: TPLF leadership worried that clergy could mobilize dissent among rural populations, necessitating control strategies.

The accumulated historical record shows that TPLF political elites have been among the most destructive forces toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church and toward Amhara communities over the last 50 years. Their ideological hostility, institutional control, armed campaigns, and discriminatory governance contributed to immense human suffering, the death of countless civilians, and the erosion of dignity for millions. These actions represent one of the most painful chapters in Ethiopia’s modern history.

For half a century, the policies and actions of TPLF leaders inflicted deep wounds on the Orthodox Church, the Amhara people, and Ethiopia as a whole. Millions suffered losses in life, culture, freedom, and dignity. Recognizing this truth is essential for national healing and justice.

Cultural Impact on Tigray

Rejecting common phrases like besemam and bisemelahi deeply impacted Tigrayan society, where religious language is embedded in everyday speech.

Effects included:

alienation of clergy,

erosion of traditional greetings,

weakening of the spiritual-cultural fabric of rural communities.

Anti-Religious Slogans in Regional Liberation Movements

The EPLF also discouraged religious language, promoting secular revolutionary slogans (Iyob, 1995; Pool, 2001). This suggests a shared ideological environment.

Reduction of Church Influence During the Armed Struggle

During the 1970s and 1980s, the TPLF gradually replaced traditional religious authority in Tigray with secular revolutionary structures.

Confiscation of Church Lands

Church lands—vital for sustaining monasteries and clergy—were expropriated and redistributed to peasants as part of TPLF’s agrarian reform (Aregawi, 2011). This economically weakened the Church and diminished its role in community life.

Displacement of Religious Authority

Traditional elders and parish councils were replaced by revolutionary committees. These bodies controlled:

dispute resolution

local governance

resource allocation

This undermined the Church’s historical role as a mediator and moral authority.

Restrictions on Festivals and Rituals

Certain festivals, processions, and gatherings were discouraged or required political approval, signaling a shift toward state (movement) control of public space.

Co-option and Repression of Clergy

Rather than abolish the Church outright, the TPLF adopted a strategy of controlled co-existence.

Appointment of Loyal Clergy

According to Berhe (2004), TPLF cadres influenced or controlled ecclesiastical appointments in strategic areas. Clergy who aligned with the movement were rewarded; those who resisted were marginalized.

Surveillance and Monitoring

Girma (2012) documents interviews with priests who recalled being monitored by local cadres. Clergy were expected to avoid sermons perceived as “feudal,” “backward,” or critical of political authority.

Suppression of Opposition

Priests who openly criticized the movement faced relocation, intimidation, or removal from their parishes.

Pressure on Religious Figures and Erosion of Institutional Autonomy

The Church’s institutional independence weakened substantially during the struggle and later under TPLF-influenced national governance.

Forced Participation in Political Activities

Some priests were coerced into:

attending political meetings,

mobilizing congregants for TPLF policies, or

giving religious legitimacy to revolutionary initiatives (Girma, 2012).

Administrative Control

By the 1980s, many monasteries and parishes found themselves reliant on TPLF structures for decisions regarding:

resource use

community gatherings

leadership assignments

This embedded the Church within the political apparatus, reducing autonomy.

Political Instrumentalization of Religious Institutions and Alliance-Building

TPLF authorities and supporters labeled the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church as a perpetrator of genocide, a claim which served both to delegitimize the Church and justify revolutionary measures. Simultaneously, TPLF cultivated alliances with the EPLF and Peoples’ Party, demonstrating strategic pragmatism: accusations against the Church strengthened internal cohesion while external alliances enhanced military and political legitimacy.

Political Meaning of TPLF Accusations Against the EOTC

Delegitimizing the Church as a Political Actor

By labeling the EOTC as a “genocider,” TPLF authorities reframed the Church — traditionally a moral and social authority — as complicit in oppression or violence.

This accusation shifts the Church from a neutral spiritual institution to a political target, providing justification for TPLF intervention or control.

Politically, delegitimization reduces potential resistance from clergy or faithful who might oppose TPLF policies.

Rewriting Historical Narratives

TPLF and its supporters often portray Ethiopian history as dominated by “imperial” Amhara elites, with the Church acting as an instrument of oppression.

This framing aligns with TPLF’s revolutionary ideology: the EOTC is cast as an oppressive structure, legitimizing past or ongoing military and political campaigns.

The accusation of genocide serves as a moral and historical rationale for revolutionary or coercive action against the Church and associated communities.

Consolidation of Power through Political Alliances

TPLF’s alliance with EPLF and PP demonstrates a pragmatic approach: while accusing the Church of genocide, TPLF simultaneously seeks support from other liberation movements.

These alliances serve to strengthen military and political legitimacy while isolating the EOTC and its supporters.

This also signals that TPLF prioritizes ethno-nationalist or revolutionary objectives over religious reconciliation, using accusations as strategic tools rather than strictly moral statements.

Moral Framing to Mobilize Support

Political accusations function as rhetorical devices: portraying the EOTC as a perpetrator of atrocities allows TPLF to rally local populations, cadres, and allies against a “common enemy.”

In revolutionary movements, moral framing often legitimizes extraordinary actions, including forced co-option, confiscation of property, or military campaigns.

Instrumentalization of Justice and Memory

By accusing the EOTC of genocide, TPLF positions itself as a defender of the oppressed, even while its own policies might have contributed to civilian suffering.

This creates a dual narrative: TPLF as liberator, Church as historical oppressor — which strengthens ideological cohesion among supporters and creates political distance from critique.

Implications

The accusation is less about verified historical fact than about political strategy, shaping power relations, and narrative control.

It illustrates the instrumental use of moral and historical claims in Ethiopian ethno-political conflicts.

This tactic effectively reframes the Church from a spiritual authority to a political adversary, while TPLF consolidates alliances with other revolutionary groups (EPLF, PP) to achieve strategic goals.

For observers, this highlights the interplay of ideology, history, and power in TPLF political discourse.

In fact, TPLF authorities banned the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church’s ancient flag, replacing it with a communist emblem. This symbolic act served multiple political purposes: it delegitimized traditional religious authority, asserted ideological dominance over centuries-old spiritual institutions, consolidated party control, and reshaped collective identity. The replacement of sacred symbols with revolutionary imagery illustrates how TPLF sought to subordinate religious tradition to its secular, Marxist-Leninist agenda.

TPLF’s Exploitation of the EOTC: Revenue and Intelligence

Historical accounts and testimonies suggest that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) engaged in strategies that extracted resources from religious institutions while monitoring and influencing their communities. This practice had both economic and political dimensions.

1. EOTC as a Source of Income

Confiscation of Church Assets:
During TPLF’s armed struggle and early governance periods, some church lands, monasteries, and other assets were reportedly confiscated or redirected to support the movement (Aregawi, 2011; Berhe, 2004).

Revenue streams from these lands (agriculture, rents, tithes) were channeled to fund military campaigns or local party administration.

Control of Donations and Offerings:
In areas under TPLF influence, local parish offerings and tithes may have been monitored or appropriated, effectively converting voluntary religious contributions into support for the movement.

Economic Leverage:
By controlling the Church’s resources, TPLF could weaken institutional independence, coerce compliance from clergy, and redistribute material assets to loyal cadres.

2. EOTC as a Source of Intelligence

Monitoring Congregations:
The Church’s parish networks provided a ready informational infrastructure, allowing TPLF to gain insights into local populations, attitudes toward the movement, and potential dissent.

Clergy as Informants:
Historical reports suggest that some clergy were pressured — either implicitly or explicitly — to relay information about community members, attendance, or political sentiments (Girma, 2012).

This turned religious spaces into semi-controlled channels for intelligence gathering.

Surveillance of Ritual Spaces:
Major religious festivals, monasteries, and communal gatherings were often observed or infiltrated by TPLF cadres, blending the line between spiritual activity and political monitoring.

3. Political Implications

Undermining Institutional Autonomy:
By converting Church assets and networks into political tools, TPLF reinforced subordination of religious authority to party objectives.

Resource Mobilization:
Income derived from Church assets directly funded armed struggle and party infrastructure, linking economic exploitation to military and political objectives.

Population Control:
Using the Church as an intelligence network allowed TPLF to preempt dissent, strengthen ideological influence, and monitor rural populations more effectively.

Legitimacy Challenges:
While pragmatically effective, this strategy contributed to long-term tensions between the EOTC and TPLF, deepening perceptions of hostility and exploitation.

4. Scholarly Assessment

Scholars such as Berhe (2004) and Girma (2012) emphasize that while the TPLF did not completely destroy religious institutions, it systematically co-opted their resources and influence.

The Church’s material wealth and social networks made it a pragmatic target for both revenue and intelligence, illustrating the intersection of ideology, governance, and survival strategies in revolutionary movements.

Political Meaning of Banning the EOTC Flag

Flags are powerful symbols of identity, continuity, and legitimacy. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church’s ancient flag, used for centuries in processions, festivals, and church governance, represented spiritual authority, historical continuity, and cultural identity (Henze, 2000).

When TPLF authorities replaced this traditional flag with a communist or party symbol, several political meanings emerge:

1. Rejection of Historical and Religious Authority

The act signified a symbolic break with the past, particularly the Church’s role as a political and moral authority in Ethiopian society.

By replacing the Church’s flag, TPLF signaled that traditional religious legitimacy was subordinate to revolutionary ideology.

The gesture communicated: the Church is no longer autonomous; it must adhere to the party’s ideological narrative.

2. Imposition of Ideology over Tradition

Flags are more than decorations—they embody collective memory and belief systems.

Substituting a communist symbol for the ancient EOTC flag reoriented communal attention from spiritual tradition to revolutionary ideology.

This represented a visual assertion of secular, Marxist-Leninist authority over religious symbolism.

3. Consolidation of Party Power

Symbolic acts like flag replacement reinforce control over institutions, even those with long-standing social influence.

By controlling what symbols could be displayed, TPLF communicated that obedience to the movement is paramount, signaling both clergy and laity that their allegiances must be realigned.

4. Cultural and Psychological Significance

Flags help communities maintain continuity, memory, and identity. Removing the EOTC flag and replacing it with a communist emblem was a psychological strategy: it symbolically eroded historical identity and replaced it with revolutionary consciousness.

This aligns with broader TPLF policies to reshape social norms, religious rituals, and collective memory in line with party ideology.

5. Political Messaging to Allies and Adversaries

The flag replacement also communicated to external observers (e.g., EPLF, PP, international sympathizers) that TPLF prioritized revolutionary identity over traditional religious authority.

Internally, it signaled that the Church could no longer act as a rival center of influence or legitimacy, reducing potential opposition.

6. Scholarly Context

Symbolic control over religious institutions is common in revolutionary movements: Marxist-Leninist regimes often altered or suppressed religious symbols to assert ideological supremacy (Iyob, 1995; Tronvoll, 2010).

TPLF’s act fits this pattern: it was not merely aesthetic, but strategic, political, and ideological.

Conclusion

 

Throughout Ethiopian history, the Orthodox Church has served as:

a legitimizing force for rulers

a landholding institution

a mediator in conflicts

a guardian of education and literacy

a cultural authority in the northern highlands

These functions made the Church a formidable institution. 

Based on the historical evidence, testimonies, and scholarly analyses presented in this paper, it is clear that successive TPLF leadership circles developed political strategies that were frequently antagonistic toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) and toward Amhara communities. The policies, ideological campaigns, armed actions, and governance systems implemented by the TPLF at various periods contributed to widespread suffering, loss of life, displacement, erosion of dignity, and long-term socio-cultural damage for millions of Ethiopians.

Revolutionary Atheism and Anti-Religious Rhetoric in the Early TPLF ….highlights TPLF’s ideological hostility toward the Church. The Meaning of the Slogan: “There Is No God… Only Victory to the Masses” …The slogan: “There is no God; never say besemam or bisemelahi; say only ‘victory to the masses’” captures the spirit of early TPLF revolutionary culture.

Interpretation

“There is no God”: Explicit atheism rooted in Marxist ideology

“Do not say besemam nor bisemelahi”: Rejection of Christian and Muslim formulas

“Victory to the masses”: Acceptance of atheistic revolutionary humanism

This is an official motto of EPLF and TPLF, it reflects widespread revolutionary sentiment.

Ideological Foundations: Marxist-Leninist Secularism

Like other Marxist movements, early TPLF ideology held that:

religion reinforced feudal hierarchies

divine authority undermined revolutionary activism

liberation must come from collective struggle, not divine intervention

Young (1997) and Tronvoll (2010) note that TPLF educational materials frequently discouraged religious thinking.

While ordinary Tigrayans should never be conflated with the actions of TPLF political elites, the institutional behavior of the TPLF as a ruling party and armed movement over the past five decades produced patterns that many Ethiopians — particularly Orthodox Christians and Amhara communities — experienced as targeted hostility. These historical patterns warrant serious scholarly attention, accountability mechanisms, and reconciliation efforts.

 

 

References

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Girma, A. (2012). Religion and politics in Tigray: The impact of armed struggle on ecclesiastical institutions. Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 45(2), 89–112.

Henze, P. (2000). Layers of time: A history of Ethiopia. Palgrave Macmillan.

Iyob, R. (1995). The Eritrean struggle for independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism, 1941–1993. Cambridge University Press.

Pool, D. (2001). From guerrillas to government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Ohio University Press.

Tronvoll, K. (2010). War and the politics of identity in Ethiopia: The making of enemies & allies in the Horn of Africa. Boydell & Brewer.

Young, J. (1997). Peasant revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Cambridge University Press.