Why TPLF and EPLF Framed Imperial-Era Atrocities as “Amhara Oppression”? (Dr. Aregawi Mebrahtu, ANU Founder and Supreme Global Leader)

Why TPLF and EPLF Framed Imperial-Era Atrocities as “Amhara Oppression”?

(Dr. Aregawi Mebrahtu, ANU Founder and Supreme Global Leader)

One of the most painful and complex aspects of Ethiopian history is the paradox of intra-ethnic collaboration in oppression. Reconciling the fact that Menelik’s military commanders—including Oromo leaders such as General Waldegebriel, Gobena Dache, Aba Jifar, and others—participated in atrocities against their own people requires understanding several historical and sociopolitical dynamics.

1. Colonial and Imperial Logic

• Menelik’s campaigns aimed to consolidate the Ethiopian Empire, and loyalty to the central authority often superseded ethnic solidarity.
• Commanders, even if Oromo, were integrated into the imperial hierarchy and were rewarded for enforcing submission, not for protecting their own communities.
• The imperial system prioritized obedience over ethnic or community ties, creating structural incentives for intra-ethnic collaboration.

2. Co-optation and Survival

• Some Oromo elites collaborated with Menelik to secure personal power, land, or status within the empire.
• In hierarchical and coercive systems, collaboration could be a strategy for survival or upward mobility, even at the cost of one’s own people.
• This phenomenon is not unique to Ethiopia; similar patterns appear globally, where subjugated groups participate in the oppression of their own communities.

3. Psychological and Social Factors

• Menelik’s campaigns created an environment where violence and loyalty to the state became conflated with legitimacy.
• Complicity was normalized as part of imperial governance—obedience was valued over ethnic allegiance, shaping the moral framework of commanders.

4. Double Standards and Historical Memory

• It is deeply contradictory and tragic that members of a community can become instruments of their own oppression.
• These actions have created long-term internal tensions within Oromo society and contribute to modern narratives of betrayal and marginalization.
• Acknowledging the atrocities does not excuse collaborators but allows for a nuanced understanding of historical pressures.

5. Reconciling the Paradox

• Ethnic identity alone did not determine political allegiance in Menelik’s empire.
• Separating personal ambition and imperial strategy from ethnic loyalty helps explain why Oromo commanders participated in violence against their own people.
• Structural violence inherent in empire-building often compels certain groups to act against their communities.

In short: Imperial structures and power incentives distorted social loyalty, turning some Oromo into enforcers of oppression against their own. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for discussions of historical justice and reconciliation.

Framework for Analyzing Intra-Ethnic Collaboration

This framework, using Menelik-era Ethiopia as a case study, can also be applied to other historical contexts.

1. Structural Context

• Imperial or colonial power structures often reward loyalty over ethnic solidarity.
• Military officers were integrated into an imperial hierarchy that prioritized obedience.
• Key question: How did the empire incentivize commanders to prioritize obedience over community ties?
• Example: General Waldegebriel’s actions—cutting off 400 Oromo hands—aligned with Menelik’s strategy to instill fear and secure submission, not with ethnic allegiance.

2. Personal Ambition and Survival

• Collaborators may act out of self-interest, including land, rank, or protection.
• Refusing to participate could mean death, loss of status, or marginalization.
• Key question: Were collaborators coerced, incentivized, or acting voluntarily to gain advantage?
• Example: Oromo elites joining Menelik’s campaigns may have sought personal security or political power.

3. Psychological Mechanisms

• Normalization of violence: Institutionalized brutality makes committing atrocities part of one’s “duty.”
• Dehumanization of victims: Depicting a group as enemies diminishes moral resistance, even if it is one’s own people.
• Key question: How did state propaganda or military culture shape the mindset of collaborators?
• Example: Menelik-era narratives depicted resisting Oromo as rebels or threats, legitimizing violence.

4. Social and Community Factors

• Community fragmentation—clans, factions, or social hierarchies—can be exploited to recruit collaborators.
• Key question: Did internal divisions make some collaborators willing to act against their own people?
• Example: Menelik may have leveraged pre-existing Oromo factionalism to recruit loyal commanders.

5. Long-Term Implications

• Collaborators leave lasting historical trauma within the oppressed community.
• Memory and identity: Communities struggle to reconcile betrayal with ethnic pride.
• Key question: How does intra-ethnic collaboration affect collective memory and future political dynamics?
• Example: Modern Oromo narratives emphasize both the brutality of Menelik’s campaigns and the role of Oromo collaborators, creating complex historical memory.

6. Analytical Approach

• Avoid oversimplification: Ethnic identity ≠ political loyalty.
• Examine incentives, constraints, and structural pressures shaping behavior.
• Consider both macro-level (state/empire) and micro-level (individual/community) forces.
• Recognize ethical dimensions: Acknowledging collaborators doesn’t justify actions but helps understand patterns of oppression.

 Conclusion

Intra-ethnic collaboration in Menelik-era Ethiopia reflects the interaction of imperial coercion, personal ambition, social fragmentation, and psychological conditioning. Recognizing these factors allows historians and communities to critically assess historical atrocities without reducing them to simple ethnic binaries.

 

Why TPLF and EPLF Framed Imperial-Era Atrocities as “Amhara Oppression”?

Understanding why TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front)repeatedly accused “the Amhara” of historical oppression—despite the fact that many imperial atrocities were committed by multi-ethnic imperial actors such as Oromo generals (Gobena Dache, Waldegebriel, Aba Jifar, etc.)—requires examining their political strategy, identity narratives, and state-building objectives.

1. Simplifying Complex Imperial History for Political Mobilization

Both TPLF and EPLF emerged from armed liberation movements during the 1970s–1990s. For revolutionary organizations, simplified enemy narratives were tactically useful.

• Imperial Ethiopia was portrayed as a monolithic “Amhara-state”, even though the empire included many ethnic elites.
• This framing helped create a clear enemy figure to mobilize support among Tigrayans or Eritreans.
• A simplified narrative is easier to teach, easier to propagate, and easier to use to legitimize armed struggle.

Result: A historically complex empire—run by multiple ethnic groups—became reduced to “Amhara domination.”

2. Ethno-Nationalist Ideology Needed an Oppressor Figure

TPLF and EPLF built their legitimacy around victimhood and liberation ideology.

To maintain internal unity, each movement needed:

• a victim identity (“our people suffered”), and
• a perpetrator identity (“the Amhara dominated us”).

This created clear emotional and political lines:

• “We are liberating ourselves from the Amhara ruling class.”
• Even when the historical evidence shows involvement of Oromo elites, Gurage nobles, Tigrayan aristocrats, and others in imperial governance.

Result: Historical complexity became politically inconvenient.

3. Political Competition With Amhara Elites

TPLF and EPLF were competing for power against:

• Imperial remnants associated with Shewa,
• Amhara political elites in Addis Ababa,
• Officers in the Derg government.

Casting Amharas as the historical oppressor allowed TPLF and EPLF to:

• weaken these political rivals,
• justify exclusionary policies,
• consolidate power in their respective territories.

This created ideological justification for:

• post-1991 ethnic federalism,
• property and land redistribution,
• rewriting national narratives in a way that delegitimized Amhara claims to unity or leadership.

4. External Influences and Geopolitical Narratives

Cold War–era influences also mattered:

• Western scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s increasingly framed Ethiopian history through a center–periphery and “dominant Amhara culture” paradigm.
• Liberation fronts adopted these external narratives to win support from international donors and ideological allies.

Result: The “Amhara ruling class” concept became globalized and academically normalized—even when historically inaccurate.

5. Avoiding Accountability for Intra-Ethnic Collaboration

If liberation movements acknowledged that:

• Oromo generals committed atrocities under Menelik,
• Tigrayan nobles governed parts of the empire,
• Eritrean chiefs collaborated with Italian colonialists,

…then the liberation movement’s simplistic moral narrative would collapse.

By placing blame exclusively on “the Amhara,” TPLF and EPLF could:

• avoid admitting that oppression was structural, not ethnic,
• obscure the roles played by Oromo, Tigrayan, and other collaborators,
• shield their own ethnic groups from historical responsibility.

Result: Blaming one group served as a form of political absolution.

6. Constructing a New National Order After 1991

After the fall of the Derg:

• TPLF rebuilt Ethiopia through ethnic federalism,
• EPLF built Eritrean nationalism on anti-Ethiopian identity.

In both projects, the “Amhara oppressor” myth:

• helped justify political restructuring,
• framed Amharas as enemies of federalism or independence,
• legitimized TPLF’s and EPLF’s dominance.

Result: A political myth became embedded in state ideology.

Summary: Why TPLF and EPLF Accused the Amhara

Despite the fact that imperial violence was carried out by a multi-ethnic coalition, including Oromo commanders, TPLF and EPLF blamed “the Amhara” because:

1. It simplified history into a clear oppressor–victim narrative.
2. It fit their ethno-nationalist liberation ideology.
3. It delegitimized their political rivals.
4. It aligned with Western academic narratives.
5. It avoided admitting intra-ethnic complicity in past oppression.
6. It justified their political projects after 1991.

This strategy was politically effective but historically misleading, distorting Ethiopia’s complex imperial past and contributing to modern tensions among communities.